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Letter dated 31 August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), I have the honour to convey a letter dated 18 August 2006 from Jean Rénald Clérismé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti (see annex), confirming the adoption of a plan for the reform of the Haitian National Police and enclosing a copy of the plan.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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Annex

Letter dated 18 August 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

I have the honour to share with the members of the Security Council, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), the reform plan of the Haitian National Police, elaborated in coordination with MINUSTAH, and adopted by the Government of Haiti on 8 August 2006.

This plan, which now constitutes a component of security sector policy represents the joint efforts of the Government of Haiti and MINUSTAH to make progress in the area of reform.

The Government of Haiti undertakes to implement this reform plan for the Haitian National Police in close cooperation with MINUSTAH and the international community, but notes that its success depends on the latter's ongoing support.

I should be grateful if the contents of this letter and its enclosure could be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean Rénald **Clérisme**
Minister

Enclosure

Haitian National Police Reform Plan

I. General considerations

Public security is a key area requiring immediate attention and vigorous efforts, as it affects the political and democratic institutionalization process and the establishment of economic recovery programmes. The current situation is alarming in that a mere 7,000 badly equipped and poorly trained police officers are responsible for the maintenance of public security. Large numbers of police facilities have been damaged or destroyed. Most of the police stations (about 200) must be repaired, built or rebuilt, only 400 Haitian National Police (HNP) vehicles are operational countrywide.

This dire situation is compounded by problems that affect relations between the HNP and the public. The only security institution in the country is perceived as being corrupt and a violator of human rights.

The problem of armed gangs aggravates the insecurity and political and social instability in the country. The lack of effective coordination between the police and justice undermines efforts to seek an effective solution to this thorny issue, which seems to threaten the social fabric itself.

Security will be approached in the context of the reforms and of strengthening all the institutions that are involved in the conception and execution of public security policy. Many of the efforts and recommendations already achieved in this area by the international community will be utilized.

With regard to the police force, Government policy, will focus on reconstruction through the approval of the HNP Reform Plan comprising short, medium and long term activities.

To this end, priority is being placed on training, quality of command, recruitment, actual troop strength, resource management, the discipline essential to an armed force, intelligence, both judicial and institutional, and development of community policing. All this will entail a reorganization of the basis of work within the HNP, with particular emphasis on the Office of the Inspector General of the HNP (IGPNH) and the Central Directorate of Judicial Police (DCPJ). As a result, the current staff will be vetted and those who do not meet the standards and criteria appropriate to a democratic police service will be removed.

Emphasis must therefore be placed on the material and financial means for such an operation which is crucial to the realization of the reform plan for the plan requires significant outlays if objectives are to be achieved. It involves making police facilities and other service buildings operational (construction and rehabilitation) and providing the officers with suitable equipment. Therefore, the means must be mobilized immediately.

At the same time, the authorities are endeavouring to reinforce and optimize coordination between the HNP and MINUSTAH in order to maintain law and order and prevent violations as effectively as possible until the HNP is able to do so alone. Maintaining peace on the streets and guaranteeing security for all are dependent on

good organization and on cooperation of the security forces present on the ground. The Government will work tirelessly to achieve this goal. It will endeavour to find urgent solutions to the violence wreaked by armed gangs.

It is equally important to act decisively to disarm all groups and individuals in possession of illegal firearms, threatening the security of the people. In this sense, the programme of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration must be re-evaluated to adapt it to Haitian realities.

The steps involved (approval of the HNP Reform Plan, detailed plans for its implementation, effective coordination to develop a plan for maintaining public order and the definition of a disarmament strategy ...) are part of a process. The establishment of a non-political and impartial police institution functioning in the strict framework of democratic rules and respect for human rights, and enjoying the people's respect and trust, requires in-depth reform and the harmonious development of the HNP. Achieving the most effective solutions and making the best use of all available resources, requires a participatory process, particularly with MINUSTAH and the various bilateral partners.

In this context, the contribution of MINUSTAH is a necessary one. Therefore, it is desirable for MINUSTAH to have a mandate and the appropriate means in the framework of Government policy and the HNP Reform. It is also desirable for MINUSTAH forces to have a more sustained engagement.

II. Executive summary

The strong desire of the elected authorities of Haiti to combat insecurity by setting up a professional police force and a functioning, equitable justice system is backed up by Security Council resolution 1608 (2005). This resolution requested the Secretary-General to share with the Security Council the reform plan for the HNP, formulated by MINUSTAH and the Haitian authorities, that included the anticipated size, standards, implementation timetable, and resources.

The attached plan was prepared based on findings made by the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) 2004-2006 of July 2004 and includes the elements required by the Security Council. Key findings are as follows:

Anticipated size: Essential policing functions in Haiti can be discharged by a service of 14,000 well-trained and -equipped officers, and this target would be achievable in the next five years, without prejudice to quality, at a rate of 1,500 new officers per year (9,000 by 2008 and 14,000 by 2011). At the same time, the Plan reflects a general consensus that 18,000 to 20,000 police and other security officers would be required to cover the full range of security needs in Haiti. In this regard, the Plan provides for a supplementary strategy for the development of specific capabilities such as a Coast Guard, border control and surveillance, fire brigades, and penal system.

Review of current HNP staff: The target figure of 14,000 police officers for the HNP will be attained through the recruitment of new personnel, together with a review of the officers currently employed. A review of the current personnel, leading to final certification, will remain a priority and will target the disciplinary and training record of each officer. While the purpose of the disciplinary check and certification will be aimed at dismissing personnel unfit for police service, training

deficiencies will be remedied through additional training. This review process is expected to be completed within two years.

Budget. According to the estimate for personnel expenditures, the budget could support the HNP staffing increase. The budget allocation for capital investments, however, is largely insufficient, indicating that the development of the HNP will rely heavily on funding from external sources. In this regard, the Bretton Woods institutions, United Nations agencies and other parties to the ICF have indicated their readiness to support the reform of the HNP.

Introduction

1. The need to re-establish law and order in Haiti is a matter of concern for the Haitian people and authorities. To achieve that end it is now urgent that an accessible and fair justice system and a professional police force be established. To this end, Security Council resolution 1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005 requested the Secretary-General to share with the Council the reform plan for the HNP, formulated by MINUSTAH and the Haitian authorities, that included the anticipated size, standards, implementation timetable, and resources. The resolution also requested that MINUSTAH and the Haitian authorities take all necessary steps to achieve optimal coordination between MINUSTAH Police and the HNP. In resolution 1658 (2006) of 14 February 2006, the Security Council called upon MINUSTAH to enhance coordination and to cooperate with other international stakeholders to effect the reform of the HNP and to finalize the overall reform plan requested in its resolution 1608 (2005) as soon as possible.

2. The HNP must be a sustainable and effective police force which respects democratic values. Using a ratio of one police officer per 500 inhabitants, Haiti should have a police force of some 20,000. However, the proposed structure will be the result of a compromise between ideal staffing levels and national resources. The desired model for the HNP is that of a professional police force staffed with officers recruited on the basis of defined criteria, and who are, consequently, well trained; a well-structured police force that has resources adequate to accomplish its mission, without external interference, and with respect for the law, regulations and human rights. Furthermore, the force will require the institutional competencies to fulfil all the roles and responsibilities as assigned to police in the Constitution of Haiti and the Law governing National Police. Should a lack of resources limit the size of the service, a proportional reduction in staffing would be necessary in all the main functions. At the same time, enhanced training would be necessary to increase staff quality to compensate for the reduction in the number of officers.

3. Extensive preliminary work has been done, providing a basis for the development of the required reform plan. Among other priorities, the ICF has suggested that the transition strategy for the HNP should pursue the following goals:

- Strengthen the organization and administrative capacities of the HNP;
- Strengthen the operational capacity of the HNP through increased staffing levels; and
- Professionalize the HNP by providing the HNP General Inspectorate with human and material resources.

4. In February 2005, the "Haiti National Police Strategic Development Plan 2004-2008" provided a detailed account of the operational and administrative processes for the HNP and provided options for subsequent phases of implementation.

Reform plan for the HNP

5. The Reform Plan for the HNP builds on earlier work to provide a comprehensive strategic management plan for the reform and development of the HNP while responding to the requests from the Security Council, including:

- the anticipated size of the HNP;
- the standards of quality which HNP officers are to meet;
- an implementation timetable; and
- specification of the resources required for its implementation.

6. The Reform Plan is structured to ensure the establishment of an effective, efficient and accountable HNP force based on:

- Democratic policing standards and democratic values;
- respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- an impartial and non-partisan approach to the exercise of its duties;
- the repudiation of corruption;
- the people's respect and trust; and
- the maintenance and promotion of respect for the rule of law, public safety, law and order, security and stability in Haiti.

Considerations relating to the development of the HNP

7. Legal considerations. Article 263 (b) of the Constitution of Haiti (1987) establishes the Haitian National Police. Articles 269-274 of the Constitution set forth the basic structures and organs of the HNP, including an Academy, a Police School and specialized sections, such as the Prison Administration, the Fire Marshall, the Traffic Police, the Highway Police, Criminal Investigations, the Narcotics Service and the Anti-Smuggling Service (article 272). An Academy and a Police School have been established under article 271.

8. This plan, prepared in response to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), focuses on the reform and development of the police within the framework of principles defined by the Constitution. It should be noted that the Constitution provides for a second armed force responsible for police-related security functions. These are surveillance of land, sea and air borders, operational support to police and assistance to the nation in case of serious events or natural disasters. As of this writing, political consensus on the establishment of this new public force separate from the HNP has yet to be achieved.

9. The tasks and responsibilities of the HNP, as defined by the Law governing the establishment, organization and duties of the Police, are to:

- ensure the protection and respect of freedom, life and property;
- guarantee the safety of Government institutions;
- maintain order, peace, security, harmony and public health;
- prevent security breaches and actively pursue transgressors for prosecution before competent courts within the timeframes set by law;
- control the ownership and possession of weapons in the national territory;
- conduct arrests in compliance with the law;
- prevent, detect and counter violations of social legislation;
- oversee all activities conducted by private security services;
- control all transit routes (land, sea, port and air);
- execute provisions related to the protection and conservation of the environment;
- provide members of the judiciary with the necessary means to attain their goals;
- provide the ombudsman responsible for the defence of human rights with the necessary support to fulfil his mandate;
- provide data for the elaboration of national crime statistics;
- participate in social, civic, cultural and educational programmes implemented by the Government of the Republic;
- carry out all other actions or activities stipulated by law.

10. Financial considerations. The decisive factor in determining the size of the HNP is the capacity of the budget to provide for the police force. Actual funding for HNP is potentially lower than the indicated budget and depends to a great extent on Government revenue, priorities in each fiscal year, and the capacity of the HNP to disburse funds. The annual budget allocation for capital investment is very limited. For the current year, the investment component of the HNP budget is US$ 655 million. Current budgetary availability indicates that the reform of the HNP will require a large external non-budgetary source or budget supplementation during this period.

11. The provisional budget, based on an overall strength of 8,000 members for the budget year 2006-2007, is approximately US$ 60 million for wages, and US$ 133 million for the budget year 2010-2011 (with a staffing level of 14,000 members).

12. The overall cost of the HNP reform, including the sectors of training, transportation, infrastructure, non-lethal police equipment, weapons and ammunition and communications is about US$ 700 million.

13. There is a general consensus on the importance of placing the initial emphasis on strengthening the management of human, material and physical resources.

Officials serving at the Ministry of Finance have also identified as urgent the need to develop the budget, finance and procurement capacities of the HNP.

Current situation

14. The situation today is alarming: more than 7,000 Police officers, ill-equipped and poorly trained, are assigned to maintain public security. Major infrastructure and police facilities are non-existent, inadequate or have been destroyed. The majority of these police stations (about 200) must be restored, built or rebuilt. Nationwide there are only about 400 HNP vehicles that are operational.

15. The HNP Strategic Plan presented and approved in March 2005 characterized the situation of HNP as follows:

> A preliminary estimate indicates that there were approximately 6,300 police officers, counting all ranks, in 2003, whereas there were in fact barely 4,000 officers in late 2004. Most of the infrastructure was vandalized or destroyed during the crisis of 2004. In June 2004, an estimated one hundred and twenty-five (125) police stations needed to be restored and seventy-five (75) needed to be built or rebuilt. Ninety per cent radio-communications facilities were destroyed or pillaged and the network operated only in the metropolitan area. The number of motor vehicles was at the bare minimum. From 300 vehicles distributed to departmental directorates in November 2003, only half were still available. Only 91 were operational in the metropolitan area. Office supplies were scarce to non-existent.

16. These conditions highlight the capital and resource difficulties and the need to remedy them upstream, as an integral part of the HNP Reform Plan. As regards facilities, in addition to the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the police stations, the current Division Headquarters in Port-au-Prince offers no suitable facilities for any of the five principal HNP organizations. This must be addressed as a matter of priority.

17. Police confidence in the HNP has been shaken by allegations of political interference, criminal behaviour and police brutality. Hence a major training and weeding-out process will be essential to strengthen capacity, professionalism and respect for human rights within the HNP to regain public trust. In general, the human resource asset of the HNP suffers from the absence of training and development plans appropriate to the exercise of its police functions. In the early years of the HNP, officers were trained without defined training standards and this has never been corrected. Overall there is now a lack of discipline and respect for the command structure and, at times, an unwillingness, at some levels, to accept the responsibilities of management and command. The HNP has yet to establish a sense of self-esteem which is essential to the consolidation of a democratic police force. In addition there is an urgent need to improve the HNP officers' conditions of employment and benefits.

18. The HNP high command has noted that the current institutional difficulties are in part the result of a system that was created by the international community in the past when it took over the management of this system, in particular the recruitment and selection of candidates, design of training programmes and handbooks and the assignment and reassignment of personnel.

19. The structure envisaged in the law establishing the HNP is one based on minimum policing needs and international norms in force and appears in general to be adequate. However, the structure, the level of training of the staff and the number of specialized units will require review as the number of officers increases, and certain directorates and divisions will need to be strengthened and/or established.

20. The following Directorates within the Central Division of Police Administration have not yet been established:

- Directorate of Security for High-level Officials;
- Directorate of Maritime, Air, Border, Migration and Forests and Port and Airport Police and Border Immigration and Environmental Police;
- Directorate of Civil Defence, Fire Management and Natural and Man-made Disasters;
- Directorate of Territorial Services.

21. The HNP has very limited capacity within its Central Division of Administrative and General Services to manage its administrative and support affairs. The Government administration procedures are clearly defined, but the internal HNP systems for these processes and procedures require in-depth review. Also, this Division has yet to establish a Directorate of Legal Affairs.

22. The HNP's ability to implement the necessary changes will depend upon full involvement of the highest levels of State and the HNP Command staff. However, their capacity to be involved in this change will be hampered by the demands on their time imposed by ongoing HNP activity.

Reform strategy

23. Drawing on discussions with Haitian interlocutors, the following approach to meet these requirements has been developed:

- Enhance the capacity of the Office of the General Inspectorate by providing technical and material resources;
- Determine the standards to apply to the HNP personnel and assess all police officers against those standards. Where the standards are not met, take appropriate disciplinary and/or training actions;
- Initiate a development planning mechanism within HNP using the technical expertise and support of MINUSTAH and international partners;
- Develop HNP training plans and build HNP capacity to expedite the basic training (including field training) of as many cadets as possible and meet the anticipated staffing targets (to be confirmed);
- Develop HNP administrative and management capacity to implement the development of HNP, once that has been defined;
- Establish an institutional support programme for HNP to achieve the target skills, capacities and standards.

24. The HNP does not have the managerial capacity to undertake these various development phases. The Haitian Government requires technical and material

assistance from MINUSTAH, the Bretton Woods institutions, the regional multilateral institutions and international bilateral cooperation partners.

Support from the international community

25. International assistance must be given in the understanding that the Haitian State is to be the primary leader of these reforms. This process must benefit from the support of the Haitian leadership and people. Bearing this factor in mind, the international assistance partners will provide development planning assistance and institutional support at the Department and Central levels. The size of the team for each Division will be determined in consultation with the Government and Police authorities, taking account of needs in terms of specialized functions. Depending on the approach adopted by the above-mentioned authorities, technical assistance will take either the form of a partnership or a team of experts attached to the various police authorities. A technical advisor for planning and development will assist the HNP Director General in managing the programmes in accordance with the reform and in coordinating international assistance.

Needs

26. The proposal regarding size of the HNP will be decided by the Government but could be reviewed according to budgetary constraints and other factors related to international assistance. However, increased capacity and performance of the HNP is a national priority. The HNP should reach a strength of 9,000 within the next two years and then continue to increase at the same rate for another three years, for a maximum strength of 14,000 not counting administrative staff. Thus the Government will be able to review and adjust its goals based on available options. The anticipated HNP police force increase is as follows:

Department/Division	*HNP projected staff levels — 2008*
General Directorate (DGPNH)	225
Office of the Inspector General (IGPNH)	110
Central Division of Administration and General Services	525
Central Division of Police Administration	2 400
Central Division of Judicial Police	350
Artibonite Department	300
Central Department	260
Grande Anse Department	205
Nord Department	510
Nord-Est Department	170
Nippes Department	125

Department/Division	*HNP projected staff levels — 2008*
Nord-Ouest Department	240
Ouest Department	3 000
Sud Department	320
Sud-Est Department	260
Total	**9 000**

27. A target of 20,000 officers for optimum security has been discussed by the Government. However, this figure is subject to the parameters referred to above. For the purposes of this plan, the staffing milestones are to increase from the current strength of 7,600 to 9,000 by 2008 and then to 14,000 by 2011 (after a weeding-out process).

Standards

28. The development of a democratic police force in Haiti depends heavily on setting and maintaining high quality standards. In principle, the HNP standards must be compatible with international norms in the profession in effect in democratic countries, taking into account Haitian sociocultural realities.

29. Since the mid-1990s, HNP compliance with professional and training standards has suffered. It is therefore important to establish new standards, in the area of recruitment, training and career development, as well as the mechanisms to ensure compliance with these standards as quickly as possible. In this regard, the HNP has decided to find, by means of conferences, lectures, seminars, etc., the answer to the crucial question of what police and what type of police Haiti should have. All sectors of Haitian society will be involved in this effort, supported by MINUSTAH and other international institutions and partners.

30. **Recruitment standards.** The present recruitment standards have been reviewed by the HNP and deemed acceptable for now, pending the outcome of the workshop with the exception of the need to add a psychological testing component. In this regard, it would be appropriate for a series of tests to be introduced with the next intake of recruits. This would require expert support to ensure that the testing is conducted professionally.

31. The conduct of background checks of HNP applicants requires some improvement. Establishment of an HNP criminal intelligence database is not only crucial for effective functioning of the police force, but would also be a valuable tool for the background check process. International technical expertise is necessary to establish this system and its related aspects. The plan includes strengthening the organizational capacity to conduct background checks. One option to achieve this could be to add a unit to the General Inspectorate to take on these functions.

32. HNP representatives have advocated using a human resource management model that provides for three grade levels, officer, inspector and commissioner. The principal difference in recruitment standard between levels would be educational prerequisites.

33. **Training standards.** The HNP has made progress in the preparation of training curricula incorporating professional standards. However, the HNP needs to continue its efforts in this direction and to manage the matter of training standards effectively. To achieve this, a joint HNP-MINUSTAH board will be established to review and approve all training programmes and material. Instructors will be recruited and trained for this purpose.

34. **Promotion standards.** Over the last 10 years, many different approaches have been used to provide the HNP rank structure. However, this has not been based on a common standard but rather on various emergency situations at the time. HNP has adopted a human resources management model that minimizes the impact on staff and ensures rapid alignment with the identified standards for promotions and appointments. This model will be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with the outcome of the Forum.

35. **Review of current personnel.** A thorough review of staff and posts, leading to final certification of the current HNP personnel, is required. It will involve two main areas:

- Background check;
- Training standards.

36. The background of each HNP officer will be checked in accordance with the HNP Regulation on General Discipline (Règlement de Discipline Générale) and other measures determined by the Conseil supérieure de la police nationale (SPN) (Superior Police Council). This process will be initiated by the General Inspectorate of the HNP. Based on the results, the strengthened Inspectorate, together with a number of MINUSTAH police officers, will form a joint team that will be responsible for the entire selection process within the organization. Once this team has provided a list of officers deemed capable of being certified, the Director General, after consultation with the Conseil supérieure de la police nationale, will issue a new identity card for each officer.

37. A training programme will be put in place for HNP officers who pass the background check in order to fill in the gaps resulting from changes in training programmes during the past 10 years. The DGPNH and the IGPNH must work to ensure that both current and future HNP personnel continue to maintain and apply high standards.

Implementation considerations

38. The implementation timetable depends on many considerations, including:

- The availability of suitable candidates for entry into the HNP;
- The need to review the skills of the current HNP personnel against current HNP entry and training standards;
- The need, when required, to dismiss officers who do not meet background standards;
- The need for supplementary training for officers whose training standards were not met in the past;

- The capacity to provide basic, advanced and specialized training both in terms of facilities and instructors;
- The organizational capacity of the HNP to absorb change;
- The level of logistical support available, including facilities and communications; and
- The rate at which the required capital investments can be provided in order to respond to needs, considering matters such as procurement capacity and delivery lead times.

Implementation sequence

Office of the General Inspectorate of the HNP

39. The immediate enhancement of the capacity and skills capabilities of the Office of the General Inspectorate is key to the successful conduct of the review of the current and incoming HNP personnel. In this regard, the Office of the General Inspectorate should be immediately staffed with additional investigators, support staff and necessary materials (vehicles and equipment) based on its responsibilities and its organizational chart. Furthermore, the Office of the General Inspectorate will be moving to new facilities by mid-2007.

40. The vetting current process must be fully operational not later than the end of the third quarter of 2006 to allow for a full review of all current HNP officers by the second quarter of 2007.

41. In the initial phase, strong international support will be required to conduct background checks of the current and new personnel who will staff the GI Office. For this, the skills required are those needed to conduct investigations, background checks and audits.

Central Division of Administration and general services (phase one)

42. The enhancement of the administrative and general support functions of the HNP needs to occur in a way that will ensure effective support for the overall development process. The basic personnel management function is an immediate priority, in the context of supporting activities of the General Inspectorate. By the end of the third quarter of 2006, the personnel systems, including the vetted staff, must be in place to maintain full HNP personnel records. During the same period, job vacancies must be entirely staffed with vetted personnel, and all personnel policies and regulations must be updated and approved by the CSPN.

43. By mid-2007, the personnel office must be established and able to submit proposals to the Director General on the assignment, promotion and appointment process. During the period 2007-2008, a review of the conditions of employment and remuneration of HNP officers must be finalized to introduce the necessary changes in the 2007-2008 budget. Other personnel support and welfare functions should be fully operational by the same time.

44. A new Directorate of Legal Affairs is another urgently needed function to provide effective support for the ongoing work of the Office of the Inspector General. Material and technical assistance is required from the United Nations and

other international partners to ensure that this Directorate is operational by the end of 2006.

45. The procurement and contracting capacity, enabling the HNP to conduct effective and timely public procurement, is another immediate priority. Within six months, HNP procurement staff must be capable of fulfilling all the conditions resulting from the reform activities. Procedures and practices are to be compliant with procurement and financial laws and auditable by that time. HNP internal procedures and instructions for logistical support processes are to be updated and then issued. Throughout the 2006-2007 fiscal year the procurement staff is to put in place long-term contracts for all routine supplies and services. The supply aspects of logistics, asset recording and the related receipt and inspection aspect must be developed in conjunction with procurement capacity to ensure that that aspect of the management process is complete.

46. The budget and finance systems must be integrated with the new personnel and procurement systems to provide effective and sound accounting and payments systems. The first stage should be in place by the start of the 2006-2007 fiscal year and the complete system should be ready for operation by the start of the 2007-2008 fiscal year. This should happen in full compliance with the financial legislation currently in effect. The system of linkage between personnel records and salary payments must be auditable. The linkage to the logistics asset management system should be in place by early 2008.

47. For a reform or development plan to succeed, priority must be given to the creation of adequate and appropriate buildings (either by constructing them or renovating them).

The construction requirements, by financial year, are as follows:

FY 2006-2007	Building for Office of the Director General Building for Office of the Inspector General Facility for Police Academy Construction of three police stations Refurbishment of 20 police stations
FY 2007-2008	Building for Centre for Intelligence Operations Building for Central Division of Administration and General Services Construction of an additional police school for 500 cadets in the region
FY 2009-2010	Construction of three regional Judicial Police Offices Construction of five police stations Refurbishment of 30 police stations

Regional departments

48. The delivery of democratic policing at the sub-station, station and department levels must be fully implemented, within staffing constraints, by 2011. A detailed implementation timetable is to be prepared for the start of FY 2006-2007 that establishes the phases for making all sub-stations, stations, and departments fully operational. The success of this programme will be determined principally by the refurbishment and reconstruction capacity available, the level of logistic support

from project start to finish, and the number of trained mid-level and upper-level officers. This programme will be carried out according to the "model station" approach, but with standards defined by the HNP for the staffing and equipment entitlements of each unit, operating and reporting procedures, and mechanisms established to foster police/community relations. Procedures for reporting incidents will by necessity be "hard copy" until a database for police information is established and the data are available. This Department-level programme should be completed by the end of FY 2010-2011.

49. The building refurbishment and rebuild schedule involves the building of nine new station facilities and the refurbishment of 50 stations each FY. Initially a radio communications system will be used for each of these units. A radio communications system with nationwide coverage for HNP should be installed by the end of 2007. This network will be augmented with a telephone and data system to connect Departments, Divisions and HNP headquarters by the end of 2009. Until FY 2008-2009, the servicing and maintenance of vehicles and equipment will depend to a great extent on whether capital equipments and vehicles provided before that time come with servicing and warranty support.

Central Directorate of Judicial Police

50. The enhancement of the judicial police function within HNP depends on other sectors such as the judicial system and the penal management systems. The training lead time needed to build professional and technical capacity is much longer than what is required to build up general policing skills. Thus, a long-term view will be taken for this division. A new space will be required to accommodate the Central Directorate of Judicial Police in Port-au-Prince by the end of 2008. Then by 2011 facilities will be required to house regional units of the judicial police.

51. The enhancement of institutional support for the Bureaus of Criminal Affairs and Trafficking and Drug Control within the Directorate of Judicial Police should build upon the technical assistance projects already established by the United Nations and other international partners. Reestablishment of the Forensics Laboratory needs specific support, including both technical equipment and training for the forensic technicians and personnel management. Particular attention will be given to the firearms, toxicology and fingerprint capabilities. The milestone for completion of these functions is the end of 2009, to coincide with the planned date for the data links with the Department level that will provide the communications needed for the fingerprint system. The criminal intelligence system must convert from a manual system to a computerized system by the end of 2009, and by the end of 2011 it should be moved to a searchable database linked to all users via HNP data links.

Central Directorate of the Police Administration

52. The Division of Police Administration will consist of four new Directorates:

- Directorate of Security for High-level Officials
- Directorate of Maritime, Air, Border, Ports and Airports, Migration and Forest Police
- Directorate of Civil Defence, Fire Management and Natural and Manmade Disasters
- Directorate of Territorial Services

53. Given the institutional development time necessary to create these organizations and the associated resource needs, the Directorate of Security for High-level Officials is expected to be established during 2006 and 2007, becoming operational in stages. For organizational integrity and operational effectiveness it is vital for all close protection elements to be under one Directorate and for their operational tactics and procedures to be standardized. The formation of this Directorate should be completed by early 2008. However, the Directorate will require suitable premises.

54. The current HNP responsibility under the Law governing the Police with regard to border management is to control all transit routes (land, sea, port and air). Elements of these control forces are currently in place but require strengthening in terms of institutional support and organizational development to meet this border responsibility. There are other matters which the Government must decide regarding integrated border management mechanisms. This category includes Customs Service, Quarantine, Forestry and border security and surveillance. These developments within the HNP will take place during the period 2006-2008 for the border entry point and immigration control function. This will also involve a review of the roles and organization of the HNP for this overall function once the related organizational and responsibility issues are resolved.

55. The role of the HNP in terms of civil defence and natural disaster management is to coordinate police support for the Civil Defence Office in the preparation of contingency plans, warning communities of approaching storms and maintaining order when providing emergency assistance. This Directorate could be established in 2006 or 2007 if international partners provide the technical assistance, as was done for the establishment of the Civil Defence Office in Port-au-Prince.

The Central Directorate of Administration and general services (phase two)

56. As the HNP reform proceeds, the nature of the administrative and general service support has to develop as well. In 2008 the service and maintenance support for the HNP must move from a warranty system to one whereby equipment provided to HNP is managed either by long-term service contracts organized under the Government procurement procedures or by developing in-house capacity. The logistical support facility will need to be constructed in 2007 to be operational by mid-2008. At that time the inventory system will have to develop into a system that links to both the receipt and inspection role on one hand and capital expenditure on the other.

57. The second phase of installation of the HNP communications network must be in place by the end of 2009. This data link will provide the essential communications between the regional Departments, the divisions and Headquarters. At the same time, the personnel management and logistics databases need to be complete and brought on line to permit better management and flow of policing information.

Training

58. The reform and development of the HNP are clearly based on training. Achieving the target quality and rate of expansion of the HNP will require providing basic training to at least 1,400 cadets per year, plus an additional number to allow for personnel attrition. For this process to be in keeping with professional standards,

the duration of the basic training programme for HNP officers should be 10 months, including seven months of course work and three months of field training. The immediate consequence of this is that the current training capacity is inadequate for both the period of the HNP reform and development, and beyond.

59. The HNP has determined that to achieve the needed training capacity the following goals must be met:

- Construction of a new Academy near the site of the current HNP School with an initial capacity of 100 students;
- Eventual construction of a new school in one of the regions, to cater to 500 officer students;
- Construction of an additional school for 500 officer students within Port-au-Prince.

60. Once operational, this infrastructure would make it possible to provide the essential basic, advanced and specialized training to achieve a growth rate of about 1,400 students per year. Ongoing requirements including re-certification and in-service training would thus be met as well.

61. The priority for the Police Academy is to deal with the mid-level management deficiency as quickly as possible to provide competent and effective officers at the stations and other police facilities.

Human resources requirements

62. The number of trainers, technical specialists and advisers to support the implementation of the HNP reform and development programme is expected to range between 150 and 200. This number includes technical assistance in all areas.

63. For the development of HNP, the national budget is expected to support the salary and essential operating costs for the HNP. The national budget, however, does not have the capacity to meet the capital investment requirements (such as infrastructure, transport, communications, weapons and training) which must come from donor contributions or budget supplementation. The initial estimate of the direct costs of these minimum capital requirements for infrastructure for the next five-year development period is as follows:

FY 2006-2007	US$ 18.4 million
FY 2007-2008	US$ 26.0 million
FY 2008-2009	US$ 29.5 million
FY 2009-2010	US$ 21.0 million
FY 2010-2011	US$ 13.5 million

However, it is important to determine the investment projections for other sectors such as transportation, training, communications and weapons.

Further actions

64. Once the HNP Reform Plan has been adopted, detailed implementation plans for each functional area of the HNP will be developed. These plans will describe the execution modalities as well as the roles and responsibilities of the international community, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral donors.

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The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 60/32 A and B of 30 November 2005, and to Security Council resolution 1662 (2006) of 23 March 2006, in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 March 2007. The present report reviews the activities of UNAMA since my previous report, dated 7 March 2006 (A/60/712-S/2006/145). During the reporting period, the Security Council received oral briefings on 14 March 2006 (see S/PV.5385), and 26 July 2006 (see S/PV.5496).

II. Current security situation

2. Since my previous report (A/60/712-S/2006/145), the most significant development in Afghanistan has been the upsurge in violence, particularly in the south, south-east and east of the country. Security has, once again, become the paramount concern of a majority of Afghans. It is estimated that over 2,000 people, at least one third of them civilians, have lost their lives in the fighting since the start of 2006. This represents a three- to four-fold increase in the rate of casualties compared to 2005. The number of security incidents involving anti-Government elements has increased from fewer than 300 per month at the end of March 2006 to close to 500 per month subsequently.

3. The growing number of casualties in the south can be attributed both to a rise in anti-Government attacks and to a corresponding increase in offensive military operations being conducted by the Afghan National Army and its international

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partners (see "Afghan security forces" and "International Security Assistance Forces" below). In the south-east, where major military operations are only just getting under way, insurgent activity has been conducted largely unchecked. Suicide attacks continue to be a highly emotive issue and are widely reported in the international media. The phenomenon is now well established in Afghanistan. The number of suicide attacks already stood in mid-August at 65, against 17 such incidents during all of 2005.

4. While previous reporting periods have been marked by progressive and significant deteriorations in the security situation, the recent upsurge of violence represents a watershed. At no time since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 has the threat to Afghanistan's transition been so severe. In recognition of the gravity of the situation, President Hamid Karzai convened Afghan security forces, their international counterparts, some representatives from Member States with a significant troop presence in the south and UNAMA to produce a shared assessment of the sources of instability. A high degree of consensus emerged from these consultations regarding the nature of the conflict. In addition to a quantitative spike in their activities, a qualitative shift was detected in the operations and coordination of the insurgent forces' intent on overthrowing the Government through violent means.

5. The insurgency is being conducted mostly by Afghans operating inside Afghanistan's borders. However, its leadership appears to rely on support and sanctuary from outside the country. The insurgency's current centre of gravity falls in and around the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and increasingly, Farah. Anti-Government operations nevertheless continue in many parts of the east and south-east and have become an acute concern in Wardak and Logar provinces, close to the capital. The insurgency now covers a broad arc of mostly Pashtun-dominated territory, extending from Kunar province in the east to Farah province in the west; it also increasingly affects the southern fringe of the central highlands, in Ghor and Day Kundi provinces.

6. Five distinct leadership centres of the insurgency can be identified. They appear to act in loose coordination with each other and a number benefit from financial and operational links with drug trafficking networks. They include: the wing of the Hezb-i-Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in Kunar province and neighbouring areas; the Taliban northern command, for Nangarhar and Laghman provinces; networks led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former minister in the Taliban regime, mainly for Khost and Paktya provinces; the Wana Shura, for Paktika; and the Taliban southern command, for the provinces of Zabul, Kandahar, Hilmand, and Uruzgan. The Taliban southern command has recently begun to establish parallel civil administrations and courts in its area of operations, although they remain marginal in most districts. Leadership and support structures for the insurgency straddle the southern border of Afghanistan.

7. The leadership centres form the hard core of the insurgency and are widely considered not to be open to reconciliation. The "strengthening peace" programme, a national initiative to reintegrate Taliban and other insurgent combatants, has had successes with mid-level Taliban commanders but has not focused on attracting senior commanders.

8. The leadership relies heavily on cross-border fighters, many of whom are Afghans drawn from nearby refugee camps and radical seminaries in Pakistan. The

fighters are typically indoctrinated, unemployed young men whose sense of identity has been blurred by years in exile. They are trained and paid to serve as medium-level commanders, leading operations inside Afghanistan, and they are able to retreat back to safe havens outside the country.

9. The foot soldiers of the insurgency are Afghans recruited within Afghanistan; they are driven by poverty, poor education and general disenchantment with their place in society. These internal fighters are not ideologically driven, but their ranks have expanded to support the growing upper echelons of the insurgency. They are thought to be ready to disengage from the insurgency if the appropriate incentives, particularly economic, are provided.

10. Dialogue with elders, clerics and other community leaders in areas affected by the insurgency has revealed a consistent set of grievances that, if properly addressed, these leaders believe could significantly weaken support for the insurgency. Government corruption at the provincial and district levels, particularly within the police and the judiciary, has alienated local populations as have unfulfilled expectations of development following the fall of the Taliban regime. Imbalances in the distribution of power between different Pashtun tribes at the provincial level have also contributed to a sense of marginalization felt by entire tribes. Finally, conservative elements of the population — a clear majority in rural areas — often view the Government's social policies as insufficiently protective of, or even harmful to, traditional religious, tribal and cultural norms.

11. The trend towards instability has not been restricted to areas affected by the insurgency. A sense of volatility has also gripped Kabul over the past three months, triggered by the violent riots that broke out in the capital on 29 May following a tragic traffic incident involving the United States-led coalition forces in the northern districts of the city. At least 25 people died on that day, and several properties were looted or burned, including four United Nations guesthouses and several compounds belonging to aid organizations.

12. Factional fighting between former commanders continues to pose a threat to security in some provinces such as Faryab, which was rocked by violent clashes between the Hizb-e-Azadi (Azadi) and National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbesh) factions. On 30 July, a confrontation between armed groups linked to both parties resulted in the death of four Azadi members and the injury of three others. Fighting continued until 9 August, reportedly killing another Azadi member and three Junbesh members. Serious human rights abuses were also reported, including numerous rapes.

III. Political developments

A. National Assembly

13. The National Assembly or Parliament, composed of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) and the Mesharano Jirga (Upper House), has been functioning effectively since my last report. The end of the first session of the National Assembly and the start of the second were largely dedicated to reviewing internal rules of procedure, defining the membership of standing committees and discussing issues of immediate

concern including national security, reviewing the national budget and conducting hearings for high-level appointments.

14. In accordance with the Constitution, the national budget was officially submitted to the Wolesi Jirga on 28 February. After a lengthy debate, the Wolesi Jirga made recommendations for amendments, most notably suggesting an increase in civil servants' salaries and in pensions for vulnerable categories of the population. Members of the National Assembly protested at not being able to discuss the donor-funded development budget, which is largely under the direct control of donors and accounts for the bulk of the total budget.

15. The Wolesi Jirga also made its mark during confirmation hearings for the Cabinet and the Supreme Court. On 22 March, President Karzai presented his list of 25 proposed Cabinet ministers to the Lower House, with a few major changes, including the candidate for Foreign Minister. Of the 25 proposed ministers, five were rejected by wide margins. Once the National Assembly reconvened after the summer recess, it confirmed five new nominees, including one woman and one minister who had previously been rejected by the National Assembly for another portfolio. The ethnic balance in the new cabinet continues to reflect the ethnic composition of the country.

16. The confirmation process for the Supreme Court began on 15 May 2006 when the Wolesi Jirga considered candidates for the nine-member Court. The Wolesi Jirga held long debates on whether some of the nominees, including Chief Justice Fazel Hadi Shinwari, met the higher education requirement and whether some nominees should be excluded for holding dual citizenship. Many saw the citizenship debate as an attempt to exclude more liberal-minded, western-educated judges. By the end of July, eight of the nine judges had been confirmed, including a new Chief Justice, Abdul Salam Azimi. On 17 August, the candidates for the head of the National Directorate for Security, the Attorney General and the head of the Afghan Red Crescent Society (a woman) were all endorsed by the National Assembly, leaving only two positions unconfirmed: the head of the central bank and the ninth member of the Supreme Court.

17. Despite its achievements, the nascent Afghan National Assembly also revealed worrying trends in its first few months. Several members have failed to break their links with illegal armed groups and criminal networks, and reports of corruption are rife. In addition, traditional power brokers and former commanders have repeatedly threatened and intimidated elected representatives. In one particularly serious case, an Uzbek member of parliament was forced to leave the country temporarily after being severely beaten.

B. Provincial government

18. Strong provincial government leadership, starting with the Governor, remains one of the most important factors in achieving progress in the fields of security, development and service delivery at the provincial level. Recent appointments of highly qualified officials in some provinces have led to notable improvements in those areas.

19. Provincial councils continue to function to varying degrees in all 34 provinces. The inexperience of members in discharging their roles, the ambiguity of their role

vis-à-vis the executive and the lack of supporting infrastructure has presented challenges to their operations. As a result, relations between the provincial executive and the councils have been uneven. Moreover, provincial development committees have been established in almost all provinces. These new structures will help to bring focus and rigor to priority-setting and planning at the provincial level.

20. In an attempt to address the weaknesses of the provincial councils, the Wolesi Jirga approved amendments to the Provincial Council Law that strengthen their monitoring responsibilities. The amended law has yet to be signed by the President.

21. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, in coordination with other international agencies, has been actively providing technical assistance to provincial council and provincial development committee members and provincial governors to improve working relations, specifically to enhance the participation of council members in subnational government activities and to improve provincial planning processes.

C. Regional developments

22. A number of positive steps are being taken by the Government of Afghanistan to foster trust and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours in a variety of sectors where lasting solutions will depend on a regional approach. To that end, President Karzai held high-level talks in the Islamic Republic of Iran in May, signing seven agreements strengthening economic, cultural and judicial cooperation between the two countries. Both countries particularly stressed the need for further cooperation in ensuring the voluntary return of Afghan refugees from the Islamic Republic of Iran and have agreed to continue joint actions with the participation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). President Karzai also paid a visit to China in June, where both countries agreed to launch a number of initiatives to combat terrorism and extremism as well as organized crime, illegal migration and trafficking of drugs and weapons. Agreements were also signed to encourage cooperation in infrastructure and energy. President Karzai also represented Afghanistan in high-level regional summits in Shanghai and in Tajikistan, which took place in 2006 in June and July respectively.

23. The Foreign Minister, Rangin Spanta, has also held high-level talks in New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington, D.C. Discussions in Islamabad on security issues resulted in agreement to intensify cooperation on improving security and bilateral relations. With proposed quarterly meetings of the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan and closer cooperation of the security services of the two countries, prospects of success in addressing the cross-border insurgency may improve.

24. Since my last report, and with a view to supporting regional dialogue to combat terrorism, extremism and drugs and to fostering cooperation on refugee issues, my Special Representative has travelled to Tehran and Islamabad to hold talks on Afghanistan and on regional issues.

IV. Security institutions

A. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and disbandment of illegal armed groups

25. The final reintegration portion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Afghanistan was completed on 30 June. Over 63,000 former combatants were disarmed, some 62,000 were demobilized and almost 56,000 of them took advantage of one of the reintegration packages on offer to them.

26. The main phase of the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) programme was launched in five provinces — Kapisa, Hirat, Farah, Takhar and Laghman — between 1 May and 7 June 2006. In spite of widespread popular support for the programme and the commitment shown by some concerned ministries and officials of the central Government, compliance to date has been disappointing, with few commanders willing to take part in the programme.

27. Although the programme aims not merely to disarm, but also to disband armed groups, the number of weapons relinquished by illegal armed groups and government officials linked to illegal armed groups serves as an indicator of the overall rate of compliance. A total of 137 commanders and 42 government officials linked to armed groups were issued notification letters since the formal launch of the programme; of those, 41 commanders and 16 officials have surrendered a total of 616 weapons — a figure far short of the 23,200 estimated by the Joint Secretariat of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission. The quality of weapons submitted, moreover, has been disappointing; just under half of those handed over in Kapisa, for example, were assessed as serviceable.

28. By far the largest impediment to the implementation of the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme has been mounting alarm over the insurgency in the southern provinces. Across the north and central highlands, community leaders who are otherwise strongly supportive of the programme have raised concerns about a possible Taliban push beyond the south, south-east and east and the capacity of the Afghan national security forces to protect them. Many commanders have exploited those fears to avoid dismantling their armed groups. At the same time, increasing rumours about authorized pro-Government militias in some areas have fuelled perceptions of a double standard in programme implementation.

29. The process of removing officials with links to armed groups continues to face political obstacles. To date, 32 officials, other than those covered in the main phase operations, have been notified in writing; of those, the Joint Secretariat (the body overseeing the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme) thus far considers 3 to be compliant and 6 to be partially compliant, and it has recommended 18 for dismissal. One targeted official has died from unrelated causes. The Ministry of Interior, in line with the Joint Secretariat's recommendations, confirmed the dismissal of 13 of its employees from their posts; a subsequent inquiry found, however, that several of the dismissed officials continued to occupy their posts in violation of the Ministry's orders.

30. A conference on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme took place in Tokyo in July, where President Karzai stated that he would use all means available to ensure that the disbandment process is carried out successfully. Donors, led by Japan, responded

with pledges totalling 90 million United States dollars ($), much of which will be allocated to disbandment development projects.

B. Afghan security forces

Afghan National Police

31. The Afghan National Police force continues to make modest strides in its overall development as a dependable public security provider. The final objective of the police reform process is to have a fully trained, professional and ethnically balanced force of 62,000 by 2010. The latest figures available from the Ministry of the Interior indicate that the Afghan National Police force consists of 65,497 police officers and patrolmen. If accurate, that number would constitute a major increase (over 10,000) in the size of the force since the last reporting period. However, a forthcoming audit is expected to reveal that there are far fewer operational police officers and patrolmen in post than currently on the books.

32. The restructuring of the leadership of the Afghan National Police continued during the reporting period. The selection process for the second tier positions in the force culminated on 4 June, when President Karzai signed a decree appointing 86 one-star police generals selected from a list of 275 officers. The announcement marked the end of months of systematic vetting conducted by senior Afghan police officers with support from the United States of America, Germany and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. On the whole, the second tier restructuring has been a positive step and has resulted in the appointment of a more professional core group of police officers to critical positions. There have been, however, some deficiencies. Fourteen officers who had failed in the selection process were added to the final list at the last minute and were appointed to key positions within the Afghan National Police force. They include a small number of well-known human rights offenders and officers with links to criminal and illegal armed groups. Following concern expressed from within the Government and démarches by several members of the international community, the Ministry of the Interior agreed that the 14 officers would be appointed for a probationary period of only four months, after which their performance would be reviewed.

33. In the face of growing insecurity in the south, President Karzai signed a rebalancing decree in June deploying 2,100 more troops to the south of the country and redeploying highway police to the Border Police in unstable areas, particularly the south. On 16 August, President Karzai also confirmed that locally recruited temporary auxiliary police would be established to strengthen Afghanistan's permanent police force. The decision to recruit auxiliary police units reflects a clear short-term gap in the capacity of the Government to provide security in insurgency-affected areas. The auxiliary police will be integrated into a unified chain of command and control within the Ministry of Interior and will receive a uniform salary and benefit package throughout the country. However, their deployment should be monitored closely in the light of concerns over the resurgence of militias outside the Government's control.

34. The challenges facing the Afghan National Police remain daunting: command and control arrangements are weak; administrative and logistical support capacity lags behind operational capability; lack of discipline is common; corruption remains rampant; and disregard for human rights and due process are also major concerns.

As a result, the level of public trust in the police remains very low. The Government continues to struggle to provide adequate equipment and logistical support to the Afghan National Police.

35. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), continues to provide remuneration and other support to the Afghan National Police. The Fund's budget was increased to $169 million for the current year but a $27 million shortfall for the police salary component remains. The shortfall has adverse implications for the implementation of the new Afghan National Police salary regime, for the provision of food allowances for officers and for severance packages.

Afghan National Army

36. The Government and donors continue to work towards the goal of a well-trained, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army force of 70,000 by the year 2010. The current strength of the Army stands at around 34,700 personnel deployed at headquarters and in five regional commands. This marks a collective increase of some 3,900 officers and enlisted men and other support personnel over the reporting period.

37. The Afghan National Army has been particularly successful in building its image as a symbol of Afghan unity, and in recent months its effectiveness has improved significantly, but it still faces a number of key challenges, including recruitment and retention of staff and timely and secure payment of salaries. It must also attend to the poor supply of equipment, weapons, food and accommodation for troops. The Army has been obliged to be on the front lines of an insurgency which did not feature in the operational plans drawn up after the fall of the Taliban regime. As a result, the Army appears sometimes ill-prepared to take on that role, and its operational capabilities are being substantially tested. The contrast between the firepower and protection of international military forces and that of the Afghan National Army is most evident when they are operating in close proximity. Nevertheless, notwithstanding heavy losses, the Army, the Police and the international military forces continue to show dedication and courage. The challenge for the Army and for the international community will be to develop the support systems and deploy the resources needed to retain and build the current core of the Army.

C. International Security Assistance Force

38. On 31 July the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took over the Regional Command South from the coalition forces, led by the United States, thus completing the third stage of its nationwide expansion. This marks a major step forward for ISAF and for NATO as the Force moves one step closer to having responsibility for all international military operations in Afghanistan, with the exception of specific counter-terrorist operations. There are currently about 18,500 troops within ISAF and 18,000 troops operating as part of the coalition forces. The total international troop presence is expected to remain unchanged. Once the transition to ISAF command countrywide is complete, it is expected there will be about 26,000 troops within ISAF and some 10,500 United States troops engaged in counter-terrorism operations.

39. Efforts are ongoing to realign activities of provincial reconstruction teams with the overall development goals of the Government of Afghanistan. On 16 August, the President endorsed the ISAF concept of Afghan development zones in the south. The zones correspond to strategically important geographic locations where improvements in security and governance will create conditions conducive to more effective, noticeable development. The initial refocused efforts are centred on Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Spin Buldak, Tirin Kot and Qalat. International Security Assistance Force provincial reconstruction teams currently exist in all of the proposed Afghan development zones with the exception of Spin Buldak.

40. During the reporting period, ISAF participated in the Tripartite Commission for the first time as a full member. The Commission brings together Afghan, Pakistani and international military forces and works to build confidence and improved relationships between the armed forces. Traditionally focused on border security, the Commission has broadened its agenda in recent months. The Commission, which was previously chaired by the United States-led coalition forces, will now be chaired by ISAF.

V. Human rights and rule of law

A. Human rights and gender

Human rights

41. The human rights implications of the deteriorating security situation are grave and civilians have at times become indirect victims of attacks by insurgents and military forces. In the spring and summer of this year, major military and combat operations between insurgent groups and the military in the south have internally displaced at least 450 families in Uruzgan and Kandahar provinces.

42. The right to education has been compromised owing to a marked increase in the number of attacks on schools since late 2005. The majority of attacks have taken place in the southern and south-eastern regions, where they are mainly attributed to insurgents or in some cases to criminal elements. From January to July a total of 202 violent incidents against schools, teachers or pupils have been recorded as compared with 99 during the previous year, partly or completely denying education to at least 105,000 Afghan children in the south. The Ministry of Education, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other partners have set up a special national task force to strengthen the protection of students, teachers, school officials and schools themselves and facilitate a rapid response when incidents arise.

43. A report on economic and social rights was released in May by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. The report, supported by UNHCR and based on approximately 8,000 interviews in 29 provinces, found that half of the respondents did not have access to safe drinking water; the lack of adequate housing was widespread and was compounded by insecurity of tenure and impunity for violators; and accessibility to and quality of clinics and hospitals remained insufficient for 40 per cent of the respondents. The report concluded that, at the time of the research (prior to the recent spike in violence), a lack of basic economic and social rights were the primary cause of ongoing displacement and the main obstacle to durable integration of internally displaced persons and returnees.

44. On 19 March four television journalists were detained overnight by the National Directorate for Security for conducting an interview with a Taliban leader in Helmand. During a demonstration in the Paghman area of Kabul province on 29 July, journalists were also attacked by armed men, reportedly close to senior governmental officials from the area.

45. The case of Abdul Rahman, who risked being sentenced to death for having converted from Islam to Christianity, attracted world attention in March. There have since been three similar cases in which Afghan citizens were accused of apostasy by local religious leaders and were forced to leave the country. Those cases highlight the obstacles to the enjoyment of freedom of conscience and religion that exist in Afghanistan and the necessity of the Government to take proactive measures to protect those rights. In that regard, the proposal to reinstate the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice within the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs is a development that will need to be closely monitored.

46. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission continues to function effectively, in close cooperation with UNAMA, although Government support for the Commission should be reinforced. The terms of office for the current members of the Commission expired in June 2004 and the President has yet to formally appoint nine Commissioners for a five-year term. Seven members of the original group of Commissioners continue to act in this capacity. For the first time since its establishment four years ago, the Commission has restricted its activities, particularly in the south and south-east, owing to security concerns.

47. Several steps were taken since my last report to transfer Afghan detainees currently at Guantanamo Bay military base and Bagram Air Base from United States military custody to Afghan authorities. A maximum security detention facility at Pol-e-Charkhi prison is being completed; prison personnel from the Ministry of Defence are being trained and a delegation from the Afghan Government visited Guantanamo Bay in June. The Government will now have to develop the modalities for the handover of the prisoners and the matter will most likely be referred to the National Assembly for approval.

Gender

48. The deteriorating security situation in parts of the country has further restricted Government efforts to ensure Afghan women and girls' full enjoyment of their rights. For example, the Women's Provincial Departments of the Ministry of Women's Affairs have ceased or curtailed operations in Kandahar, Uruzgan and Hilmand. Continuing attacks against educational institutions are having a disproportionate impact on girls, as they have lower initial rates of enrolment and literacy than boys.

49. Although the Wolesi Jirga confirmed the appointment of a new Minister for Women's Affairs on 7 August, the extended period of ambiguity in the Ministry's leadership hampered its efforts to support Government policy development. Despite this challenge, staff of the Ministry are actively involved in supporting the Afghanistan National Development Strategy process.

50. Women's participation in State institutions remains low. Civil society groups and some members of the international community have urged the President to appoint more women to the Cabinet, the Supreme Court and the Civil Service.

B. Rule of law

51. Although some progress in the reform efforts is being made, Afghanistan's justice system continues to suffer from severe and systemic problems. With the support of the United Nations and donor nations (led by Italy and the United States), judges and prosecutors are being trained, more defendants are receiving legal representation, courthouses and prisons are being built or refurbished and the capacity of the permanent justice institutions has been enhanced. Key legislation has already been put into place and, with United Nations and donor support, a new criminal procedure code, an anti-terrorism law, a new law on the organization of the prosecutor's office and a law establishing an independent bar association for Afghanistan are in the process of being drafted.

52. In support of the strategic coordination of the Afghanistan Compact (S/2006/90, annex) and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the justice and human rights working group was established in June 2006, chaired by the Ministry of Justice, with UNAMA and Italy as the international co-focal points. The working group is responsible for gathering data, undertaking analysis, developing strategies, policies and programmes linked to the achievement of the Afghanistan Compact and the benchmarks of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and assisting in the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process.

53. The quality of the Supreme Court has been regarded as a touchstone for the Government's commitment to justice reform in Afghanistan. The new composition of the Supreme Court reflects a fairly even ethnic balance. However, no female judges were nominated.

54. Considerable challenges continue to face the judiciary. They include low levels of education and competency, inadequate salaries, insecurity of judges in terms of career progression, tenure and personal safety. The findings of the Supreme Court's report on judicial education issued in May 2006 highlighted the fact that only about a third of the 1,415 judges currently working in Afghanistan have higher education qualifications and that there remains a system-wide lack of fundamental judicial competencies. Approximately 170 new judges are currently finishing their training under the auspices of the Supreme Court. Once the graduates take up their posts, the Supreme Court estimates that a further 300 posts, out of a total of 1,884 approved positions, will need to be filled.

55. The failure to ensure a secure environment for courts and judicial personnel undermines recent reform efforts, as well as the overall capacity of the legal system to act impartially and independently. In May 2006, the deputy civil court judge of Farah province was shot dead. In June, suspected Taliban-linked militants abducted and killed a local judge in Ghazni province.

56. The situation regarding prisons in Afghanistan remains serious. However, with the support of the international community, significant reforms are being carried out. A number of major prison projects are currently being carried out including two new prison facilities in Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif, and a women's facility and a juvenile reformatory in Kabul. As part of the Government's anti-narcotics strategy the construction of a high security unit at Pol-e-Charkhi prison for high-profile drug offenders is nearing completion.

57. A new national training programme for all prison staff has been developed and implemented as of June 2006. Training of staff selected to work in the high security drug facility is now complete, with 140 trained staff. On 29 July 2006 the first of seven training sessions to promote and implement the new law on prisons and detention centres at the provincial level began in Kabul.

VI. Economic and social development

A. Humanitarian situation

58. Afghanistan is facing a severe drought affecting up to 2.5 million people. The total shortfall for the present harvest is estimated at 1.2 million metric tons of cereals. To address the crisis, a joint Government-United Nations drought appeal for $76 million was launched on 25 July. The appeal covers the period from July to December 2006, with a few components extending beyond this time frame. The Government's Emergency Response Commission is leading the drought response process, with support from designated ministries, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, UNAMA, UNICEF and the World Food Programme. At present, slightly less than half of the appeal has been funded by donors, the United Nations and from the Government's own resources.

59. Insecurity has taken a serious toll on the capacity of the United Nations and aid organizations to deliver their humanitarian programmes in insurgency-affected areas. The majority of districts in the south are chronically or temporarily inaccessible for United Nations movements. During the reporting period, UNICEF and the World Health Organization have faced serious obstacles in conducting polio immunization campaigns in the south. To date, 25 of the 26 reported polio cases were detected in the south. Despite worsening security conditions and a reduced presence, United Nations agencies and UNAMA continued to be present in the south, south-east and east, and agencies are exploring new ways of delivering their services to populations in those insecure regions.

60. Despite the prevailing situation, Afghan refugees continue to return. The total number of returnees this year is over 122,000, mostly from Pakistan. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is preparing to assist a total of 220,000 returnees this year. Early in 2006, the Pakistani Government announced it would close four refugee camps in the North-west Frontier Province and in Balochistan. The 250,000 residents were offered the option of returning to Afghanistan or relocating to other camps in Pakistan. The 31 July deadline for closures passed with little or no movement and, it is not clear if the Government of Pakistan will take more direct action to close the camps.

B. Economy and government revenue

61. Initial projections by the International Monetary Fund put Afghanistan's rate of growth at 12 per cent for 2006. However, the projections were scaled back to 10 per cent during the reporting period owing to the drought and its impact on the country's agriculture. The wheat sector, in particular, experienced a 25 per cent drop in production. At the same time, inflation has fallen faster than expected and is currently estimated at 7 per cent, down from 9.5 per cent in March 2006. Revenue

collection in 2005/06 reached 5.5 per cent of gross domestic product against a target of 5 per cent, largely on account of higher customs receipts. However, current trends indicate that this fiscal year's collection will not exceed the target. The share of operating expenditures financed by domestic revenues rose from 47 per cent in 1382 (2003/04)[1] to 59 per cent in 1384 (2005/06), and is budgeted at 63 per cent in 1385 (2006/07), but this is still insufficient to reach fiscal sustainability rapidly.

C. Development strategy

62. During the reporting period, new mechanisms to elaborate, coordinate and implement Afghanistan's long-term development strategy were formulated. While the Afghanistan Compact describes the shared political commitment of Afghans and the international community, the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) sets out the strategic priorities and plans for achieving the Government's development vision. The structure of the interim Strategy mirrors the three pillars of the Compact: (a) security; (b) governance, rule of law and human rights; and (c) economic and social development. The Strategy subdivides the three pillars into eight sectors. In May, eight restructured consultative groups were launched to coordinate strategic guidance on development priorities in each sector. Concerned line ministries and interested donors participate in the groups. Each group is co-chaired by the Minister of Finance and a relevant member of the Government's Oversight Committee, the body of ministers responsible for the implementation of the interim Strategy and preparation of the full Afghanistan National Development Strategy (projected for 2008). In addition, the oversight committee has now been given responsibility for reporting to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (see below) on progress towards the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. The consultative groups support the Oversight Committee in that endeavour.

63. During the reporting period, 22 technical working groups were set up under the consultative groups to develop detailed strategies, annual action plans and projects for each line ministry. In June and July, the technical working group met to develop specific indicators and targets for each of the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. They also prepared draft strategies and an action plan for Compact and interim Strategy implementation for the coming year. The consultative groups are scheduled to review the draft strategies in September and October. The Mission and other United Nations agencies provide secretariat services, coordination and logistical support to the Oversight Committee, the consultative groups and their subsidiary bodies.

VII. Counter-narcotics

64. At a joint press conference on 3 September 2006, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics presented the findings of the Office's opium survey. Poppy cultivation increased 59 per cent this year, from 104,000 to 165,000 hectares. Opium production increased from 4,100 to 6,100 tons. Afghanistan now accounts for 92 per cent of the total world supply of opium and its

[1] The Afghan calendar begins on 21 March of the year in progress and ends on 20 March of the following year.

derivative, heroin. This comes after the first significant decrease was achieved in 2005. The increase occurred mainly in the southern provinces, primarily Helmand, where cultivation soared 162 per cent to 69,324 hectares. Six provinces, mainly in the central region, remain poppy-free. Eight provinces, mainly in the north, had a decrease, with the notable exception of Badakshan province.

65. The increase in the number of provinces where the opium poppy is cultivated is also of concern. While in the late 1990s about 15 to 20 provinces cultivated the poppy, a steady expansion has occurred since 2002, and it is now cultivated in 25 to 30 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Assessments suggest that the farmers' decision to grow the poppy is made only for economic reasons but is also driven by pressure from traffickers, local criminal groups and corrupt officials who stand to benefit the most. Estimates indicate that 80 per cent of the opium profit in 2005 (roughly $2.14 billion) was made by traffickers.

66. The sizeable harvest in 2006 comes in spite of increased eradication programmes, which were carried out relatively peacefully, except for a few incidents in Helmand and Badakshan provinces.

67. Progress has been made in strengthening the law enforcement side of the counter-narcotics effort. The Afghan National Police force and its specially trained counter-narcotics unit seized over 66 tons of narcotics (including opium, heroin and cannabis) and 13,000 litres of precursor chemicals used in the refinement of drugs during the first six months of 2006. The Counter Narcotics Tribunal and the Counter Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force, established in 2005, have now become fully operational. Several hundred cases have so far been processed in Kabul, in accordance with the regulations of the Counter Narcotics law. Worryingly, domestic drug abuse appears to be rising, with an estimated 920,000 drug users in Afghanistan.

68. The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund, a Government-executed fund with a current resource level of over $70 million, became operational in early 2006. Some projects with a total funding of over $10 million (including those promoting alternative livelihoods and reducing drug demand) have so far been approved.

VIII. Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

69. As called for in the Afghanistan Compact, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board was established during the reporting period. The Board is charged with providing high-level coordination and political guidance for the implementation of the Compact benchmarks. The Board is co-chaired by Ishaq Nadiri, Senior Economic Adviser to President Karzai, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Its formation followed extensive consultations on membership in which the international community expressed strong interest in representation. Agreement was eventually reached that the Board would be comprised of 28 members (7 Afghans and 21 internationals). In addition to the Co-chair, the Government of Afghanistan is represented by the members of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Oversight Committee. Aside from the Special Representative, international members include the following: the six largest contributors of development assistance to Afghanistan (the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, Germany, the European Union and India); three neighbouring countries (Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of

Iran and China); countries in three regions (Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Russian Federation); the international military supporters (NATO, coalition forces, Canada, the Netherlands, Italy and France); and two international financial institutions (World Bank and Asian Development Bank).

70. At its inaugural session on 30 April, the Board approved terms of reference and reviewed monitoring matrices, which will be used to measure the implementation of Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. It was agreed that the forum would meet on a quarterly basis. At its second session on 30 July, the Board considered the action plan for power sector reform, which aims to overcome energy shortages and define a midterm energy sector strategy. The Board also reviewed progress towards the elements of eleven benchmarks, which are to be completed in the first year of the Compact. In seven areas, efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners were assessed to be on track. Those areas include elements of the benchmarks related to anti-corruption; the National Assembly; the rule of law; land registration; water resources management; skills development; and financial services and markets. In four areas, some delays had been encountered, drawing Compact deadlines into question. These include elements of the benchmarks related to the senior appointment mechanisms; the review of administrative boundaries, mining and natural resources; and private sector development and trade.

71. There is a shared view that a distinction should be drawn between procedural and substantive achievements when assessing implementation of the Compact. In its early days, the Board's monitoring process focused on procedural elements of the benchmarks. For example, under the corruption benchmark, one of the main indicators is Afghanistan's ratification of international treaties on corruption. While the ratification process is assessed to be on track, little progress has been made in the fight against the prevalence of public sector corruption. Similar procedural elements of other benchmarks are largely assessed to be on track. By contrast, only modest progress has been made to date in realizing more substantive benchmarks. However, the Board is helping to coordinate efforts and build consensus, not least that achieving substantive progress towards the Compact benchmarks will require long-term, coordinated political commitment and action on the part of all parties involved.

IX. Mission operations and support

72. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has been able to continue to implement its mandate, despite heightened security concerns. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1662 (2006), two new UNAMA provincial sub-offices were opened in Zabul and Kunar provinces. Following a review of the experience in the two provinces, the Mission will consider expanding to up to seven additional locations across the country. The cautious expansion of the Mission to underserved parts of the country is sending a strong message to Afghans that the United Nations will continue to help the Government improve delivery of services to Afghans, even in parts of the country that are affected by the insurgency.

73. As the Mission expands, there is an increasing need for UNAMA military liaison officers to be present in the sub-offices to significantly strengthen the presence and influence of UNAMA through liaison at the local level with the

international military forces and the Afghan National Army and through the provision of advice and support to the field offices. I therefore propose that the Military Advisory Unit be enlarged by an additional 6 officers (at the Lieutenant Colonel level) bringing the total to 18 officers, consisting of one military adviser and 17 military liaison officers. The additional 5 military liaison officers will serve in the newly opened sub-offices and the sixth officer would serve in the UNAMA joint mission analysis cell. The Unit will also continue in its routine role of supporting the growth of governance, promoting programmes such as the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme and providing analysis of the provincial military security situation.

74. The overall deterioration of the security situation has heightened the risks to the United Nations of becoming a target of opportunity. Programme activity, particularly in the south, south-east and east, has been reduced accordingly and measures to mitigate threat have been put in place. Of the 16,000 road missions fielded by the United Nations during the reporting period, only two clearly identifiable United Nations convoys came under attack.

X. Observations

75. Since my last report to the Security Council on Afghanistan, the country has made some impressive strides for which its Government and people are to be congratulated. The new National Assembly has demonstrated independent, reformist and democratic credentials. Provincial councils are now functioning in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board has been established, bringing together senior Afghan officials and their international counterparts to oversee the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

76. At the same time, Afghanistan finds itself in the midst of a new crisis. A third of the country is racked by violent insurgency. The situation in the south, south-east and east is unlikely to improve in the near future and the prospect of further deterioration cannot be excluded. While the rest of the country remains relatively secure, Afghans everywhere understand that the insurgency poses a grave threat to the political transition nationwide. If not addressed urgently and comprehensively, the insurgency could jeopardize the considerable achievements of the Bonn process and plunge parts of the country into chaos and uncertainty, with considerable spillover effects across Afghanistan. Although events on the ground have tempered the optimism that surrounded the London Conference earlier this year, they must not lessen our resolve. The Government of Afghanistan, its regional partners and the rest of the international community must stand ready to redouble our collective efforts — including political and financial commitments — to stabilize Afghanistan and support its transition in the face of growing challenges.

77. In the light of the above, the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to the south of Afghanistan is a particularly welcome and timely development. I recognize the contributions and sacrifices being made by all Member States currently taking part in the Force, and I strongly encourage all nations to continue to support the Force as it expands its command to the rest of the country.

78. Elements of a strategy to tackle the insurgency are emerging from discussions led by the Government and members of the international community involved in the areas of the country affected by the surge in violence. The leadership centres of the

insurgency described in the present report must be dealt with through robust military and law enforcement measures wherever they are found in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The nature and scope of dialogue among all actors involved must be enhanced with a particular view to disengaging the bulk of combatants from the leaders of the insurgency. Communities need to be further engaged and empowered to play a greater role in bringing stability to their areas. At the same time, the capacity of the Government to deliver security and other basic services and bring development must be reinforced, not least to address growing frustration at the slow pace of change in the lives of ordinary Afghans.

79. In that regard, the international community and the Government must intensify their efforts to improve and accelerate reform of the Afghan police. The international community should, wherever possible, provide intensified advising, mentoring and training through the provision of additional qualified police personnel deployed with the Afghan National Police in the field and within the frameworks of existing training regimes. The Government and the international community must study current administrative, budgetary and logistical systems in place and take immediate steps to ensure that the men and women of the Afghan National Police receive their salaries and other support in full and in a timely fashion to stem defections and maintain morale and dedication in the rank and file.

80. President Hamid Karzai is to be commended for his handling of the cabinet confirmation process and for the appointment and confirmation of a highly qualified Supreme Court. The prospect of stronger judicial institutions — one of the principal demands expressed by Afghans — has been revived by the arrival of the new judicial leadership. This moment of opportunity should not be lost, and I urge the national and international bodies working on justice reform to redouble their efforts to extend the rule of law in Afghanistan.

81. The programme to disband illegal armed groups addresses one of the clearest and most consistently expressed demands of the Afghan people, but compliance to date has been disappointing. The Government and the international community must continue to make the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme a priority as it is a prerequisite for meeting other core objectives under the Afghanistan Compact, particularly with respect to security, governance and the rule of law.

82. Corruption and the narcotics industry continue to threaten Afghanistan's transition and must be dealt with as matters of priority by the Government and the international community. I am increasingly concerned that administrative corruption continues to hamper efforts to improve governance and government service delivery at all levels in Afghanistan. Similarly, the growth of the drug trade, which fuels both insurgency and corruption, calls for new strategic direction in current policy. This will need to include more decisive action against traffickers and those who protect them, as well as a more integrated rural development strategy.

83. Further attention is required by all to ensure that international principles are upheld in relation to the protection of civilians in armed conflict during this period of increased insecurity and combat. The Taliban and other anti-Government forces continue to demonstrate an inexcusable disregard for the value of human life. Efforts to combat the insurgency should seek to minimize the potential for civilian casualties. Afghan security forces and their international partners must also be wary of invoking the security situation as a justification to suppress human rights guaranteed by the Constitution and under international treaties to which Afghanistan

is party. I remain equally concerned about the human rights situation in areas not directly affected by the current wave of violence. We must not allow the protection of human rights throughout Afghanistan to become another casualty of the current conflict. In that respect, the implementation of the National Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice adopted in December 2005 has yet to gain momentum.

84. The challenges facing the country are daunting but the international community as well as local communities must continue to work hand in hand with the Government towards the long-term vision expressed in the Afghanistan Compact. Productive partnership between the Government and international donors resulted in a single development process in the form of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy framework. This aims to deliver results as much as it aims to build sustainable Afghan institutions. This dual imperative should be enhanced through improved coordination, cooperation and implementation.

85. The ability of the Board to engender high-level collaboration will depend on its ability to move from process and planning to action and oversight. It has yet to become the active custodian of the Compact envisioned during the London Conference that will hold the Afghan Government and its international partners to account. Afghan and international members of the Board will need to work more closely in a spirit of partnership and effectiveness to ensure that the ambitious agenda is achieved to the greatest benefit of the Afghan people.

86. In conclusion, I would like to convey my sincere appreciation to the Security Council and other Member States for their continued support to Afghanistan. I would like to pay tribute to the dedicated efforts of my Special Representative, and to the women and men of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and their partner organizations who continue to carry out their mission under difficult and increasingly dangerous circumstances. I salute their courage, dedication and commitment.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous report to the Council, dated 23 June 2006 (S/2006/426).

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. When I attended the inauguration of the presidency of the Government of National Unity and the signing of the Interim National Constitution in Khartoum on 9 July 2005, I called on the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to fulfil their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement promptly and completely. One year later, the parties are in the process of implementing some of the security arrangements set out in the Agreement, while there has not been much progress in respect of their power — and wealth-sharing obligations. Indeed, the parties continue to contest the interpretation of several aspects of the Agreement, and have neglected other commitments.

3. UNMIS and the wider United Nations system have continued to play a key role in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In accordance with its Security Council mandate, the peacekeeping Mission has provided good offices and political support to the parties, monitored and verified their security arrangements and offered assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development.

4. Overall, the parties' efforts to implement the security provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have reduced the likelihood of future conflict. The continuing redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from southern Sudan is generally on schedule, although the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has accused SAF forces of concentrating around oilfields in the region bordering between the north and the south, rather than redeploying further north. In the

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months ahead, it will be crucial for the transfers of military command to take place in all areas in southern Sudan.

5. In its meeting held on 4 July, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, created under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, established that SPLA had completed its redeployment from eastern Sudan. The redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763 was verified by UNMIS. The troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned SPLA. The completion of the redeployment marked an important milestone in the implementation of the Agreement, as well as the end of the UNMIS monitoring mandate in the east of the country. UNMIS subsequently commenced its withdrawal from that region.

6. Comprehensive Peace Agreement security mechanisms, such as the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees, are largely functioning as intended, investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions. These mechanisms played a significant role in the peaceful resolution of a number of incidents that could have triggered wider conflict, notably, the March ambush of an unarmed convoy north of Abyei, and the August clash between off-duty SPLA and SAF officers in the Rubkona market in Unity State, in which eight civilians and three soldiers were killed.

7. However, southern Sudan is still suffering from insecurity due to the presence of other armed groups, communal violence and forced disarmament campaigns. While SPLA has absorbed much of the former Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), other armed groups remain a major threat throughout southern Sudan. The proliferation of small arms has contributed to the loss of hundreds of lives in communal clashes over land, water and grazing rights. An SPLA operation intended to disarm the rogue White Army at Jonglei in May sparked serious armed clashes. The parties have fallen well behind schedule on the incorporation of other armed groups into their forces. The Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee met for only the second time, in Juba on 5 August, agreeing, however, that the parties would alternately chair regular meetings in the future. While each party has provided the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee with a list of aligned other armed groups, their actual alignment status, composition and location remain vague.

8. Also, the formation of Joint Integrated Units has been slow. The parties are approximately 18 months behind schedule on this important aspect and are unlikely to meet the 1 October 2006 deadline for the completion of co-location, training and deployment of the Units. At the same time, the parties have taken the first step of co-locating such units in Juba, Torit and Khartoum. However, in order for the Units to be truly effective and for them to fill security gaps left by SPLA and SAF redeployments, they need additional training, as well as budgetary and material support. Much also remains to be done in the area of integrating the units and defining their command structures.

9. At meetings of the Ceasefire Political Commission and through the Joint Defence Board, both parties have identified the need and expressed their desire for international support for the establishment of Joint Integrated Units. In order to advance the issue, UNMIS has invited them to submit a formal request to the international community. In addition, on 9 August the UNMIS Force Commander convened a meeting with representatives of embassies in Khartoum to discuss areas in which the international community can assist in training for the Units. For its part, the Government of Southern Sudan will require substantial international

assistance to restructure, train and equip SPLA while developing the administrative capacity to support a modern army. Some SPLA soldiers have not been paid for many months, which has led to isolated clashes and instances of insubordination. Comprehensive Peace Agreement-mandated troop reductions will also require international support for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration effort.

10. International support will also be important for the reform of the rest of the Sudanese national security sector. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires the parties to adopt a National Security Act to govern the National Security Service and create a National Security Council charged with implementing reforms. The UNMIS mandate includes helping the parties restructure the Sudanese police service with support from bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes. The parties have made little progress at the national level, however. While key security agencies are reviewing draft amendments to the existing National Security Act, no proposals have been released for public comment.

11. Despite some positive signs on the security side, the parties are well behind schedule in implementing the power- and wealth-sharing aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, where there is little progress to report. In the key area of oil, they continue to disagree on whether the National Petroleum Commission, on which both parties are represented, should be an advisory or a decision-making body, on the nature of its relationship with the Ministry of Energy and Mining and on its participation in oil contract negotiations. In this regard, the Ministry needs to display further transparency to ensure fairness and accuracy in oil-revenue calculations.

12. The related north-south border issues have proved similarly contentious. While the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee met once during the reporting period, it has not yet commenced substantive work on border delineation, and was delayed by the onset of the rains. This task is urgent because the lack of an agreed delineation of the north-south border hinders or confuses obligations relating to military redeployment, the distribution of oil revenues, Joint Integrated Unit formation and, eventually, the referendum to confirm the unity of the Sudan or allow the secession of the south.

13. Similarly, the parties have made no progress on implementing the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, since NCP rejected the Abyei Boundaries Commission report issued in July 2005. Meanwhile, the failure of the presidency to appoint a local Executive Council or Abyei Area Council has left the people of that region largely without formal policing, public sanitation and health services. Abyei remains a serious potential flashpoint with regard to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

14. The parties' difficulty in reaching decisions and compromises has slowed implementation in a number of other areas. The Ceasefire Political Commission has proved unable to resolve a number of issues on its agenda, including restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas. At a meeting convened in May to address contentious issues including Abyei, the NCP-SPLM joint leadership chose instead to refer the issues to the presidency, which has yet to deliver its decisions. In August, the parties established a new layer of joint committees, and the issue of Abyei is now in the hands of a subcommittee of the NCP-SPLM Joint Political Committee.

15. Altogether, the parties have so far failed to give other obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement sufficient priority, despite the fact that the joint Government continues to function. Hardly any action has been taken to start preparing for national elections, originally scheduled for mid-2008, but deferred to mid-2009 by the Interim National Constitution.

16. Few of the commissions called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement function as originally intended. The National Constitutional Review Commission, charged with reviewing national legislation, has not met this year. The National Assembly has passed only one act establishing a commission, and the National Constitutional Review Commission did not review that act as required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Legislation necessary to establish the National Human Rights, Civil Service, Land and Electoral Commissions is still pending. However, there are encouraging signs of the National Assembly emerging as a vibrant forum for broad political dialogue. During the second session, parliamentarians from a wide variety of political parties held intensive discussions on a number of national issues and issues related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. The parties have also fallen behind schedule in implementing the legislative reform agenda required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The National Assembly concluded its three-month second session in July without passing any legislation related to the Agreement. At its next session, the National Assembly is expected to consider critical draft legislation on electoral issues, political parties and the national security sector. However, the parties have not yet released drafts for public discussion. Those laws will have a major effect on the future of the country.

18. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission continues to monitor implementation through its plenary and four working groups, which focus on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security and the three areas dealt with separately in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Protocols, i.e. Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. On 16 August, UNMIS joined the Assessment and Evaluation Commission at its eleventh plenary meeting as an ex officio member, and was welcomed by the parties and other international members of the Commission. However, the parties have not displayed sufficient interest in the Commission, nor are they yet fully utilizing the mechanism to advance the peace process.

19. For its part, SPLM is facing the natural challenges of transforming itself from a liberation movement into an inclusive political party and government that reflect the diversity of the peoples of southern Sudan. Its Interim Political Bureau, charged with overseeing internal party reform, was endorsed in April 2006 in Rumbek, and the second party convention was expected to be convened before the end of the year.

20. During the early stages of the reporting period, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued to attack civilians and destabilize the area along the Sudan's borders with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Military efforts have so far failed to eliminate it as a threat, in part because of coordination difficulties among the affected states. Following an extended effort of the Government of Southern Sudan, the Government of Uganda and LRA launched talks in Juba on 14 July, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan. The negotiators face a number of complex and contentious issues, but the current talks are unprecedented. In Juba, on 26 August, the Government of Uganda and LRA signed a

cessation of hostilities agreement that requires LRA members to assemble at two designated points in southern Sudan.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Political support and reconciliation

21. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), UNMIS continued to provide good offices and political support in several areas to help implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolve other conflicts in the Sudan. In southern Sudan, UNMIS used its good offices to help restore calm in a number of volatile situations, including the clashes caused by the forced disarmament campaign in Jonglei and the Rubkona market incident. Starting on 11 August, UNMIS convened several emergency meetings of the Area Joint Military Committee to secure a halt to the fighting between the SPLA and the SAF-aligned Pangak Peace Force in sector III (Malakal). Also, UNMIS liaison and good relations with most commanders of SAF, SPLA and other armed groups proved crucial in de-escalating the tense situation in Upper Nile State. More broadly, UNMIS continues to perform an important early warning role throughout southern Sudan, identifying and acting to defuse intercommunal tensions.

22. UNMIS has monitored the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front, which began in Asmara on 13 June. The parties decided not to involve other international actors in the talks at this stage, and did not take up the UNMIS offer of technical and expert support for the negotiations. Eritrea's role in the talks also confirms the warming of relations between Eritrea and the Sudan; on 12 June, the Presidents of the Sudan and Eritrea met for the first time in more than five years.

23. UNMIS also assisted in efforts to implement and build support for the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Mission continued to persuade the non-signatory groups to support the Agreement, and participated in the work of the African Union (AU)-led Joint Commission and Ceasefire Commissions. The United Nations organized six workshops in Nyala and El-Fashir to explain the Darfur Peace Agreement, targeting a wide range of stakeholders, including the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), civil society organizations, women's groups and traditional leaders. UNMIS also provided its good offices to promote discussions between AMIS and internally displaced persons in Zalingei, allowing the latter to express their concerns and the former to resume patrol activities in the camps.

24. During the reporting period, UNMIS support for AMIS increased substantially in line with the additional tasks and responsibilities that AMIS has assumed under the Darfur Peace Agreement. AMIS developed a new concept of operations, which the AU Peace and Security Council approved on 27 June. UNMIS also responded to AU requests for assistance relating to communications, logistics, transportation, public information and humanitarian issues. The United Nations and AU are currently formulating a support package for AMIS to enhance its capability and help it to implement its mandated tasks. However, the position of the Sudanese Government with regard to Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) and transition of peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur from AU to the United Nations has been

very negative. The United Nations will continue to engage Khartoum on this very important issue.

Military deployment and activities

25. UNMIS has now deployed almost all of its expected total of 9,880 military personnel. As at 4 September, 8,727 troops, 695 military observers and 186 staff officers drawn from 61 countries had taken up their duties in the Sudan.

26. With the completion of SPLA redeployment to the south, UNMIS Redeployment Coordination Headquarters, based in Kassala, had fulfilled its tasks in eastern Sudan, and its drawdown was initiated on 1 August. While Redeployment Coordination Headquarters staff officers from Nepal and Germany will be repatriated, the Nepalese infantry company will deploy to another United Nations peacekeeping operation, and military observers have been reassigned to sectors in the South. At a farewell ceremony held on 29 July, the Wali of Kassala stressed that United Nations agencies could continue their humanitarian work in the region unhindered. I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the important role of the Redeployment Coordination Headquarters in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in eastern Sudan.

27. In recent months, UNMIS has bolstered its presence and security in Equatoria. As the Council will recall, the Mission is mandated to help protect civilians facing an imminent threat within its areas of deployment and capabilities. With respect to LRA, the role of UNMIS is currently limited to coordination and information-sharing with the Sudanese authorities, other affected Member States and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as described in my report of 29 June 2006 (S/2006/478).

28. Regrettably, the Sudanese customs service in Port Sudan and Khartoum delayed for extended periods the release of a wide range of items, including food rations. It had held some major communications equipment since February and generally clears United Nations stores and supplies at an extremely slow pace, creating significant logistical obstacles to the operation of UNMIS forces. UNMIS has protested many times, and at many levels, to the Government about this issue. The situation has now slightly improved; however, UNMIS communications equipment has yet to be released.

29. In the meantime, customs delays and rain-related road closures have increased the reliance of UNMIS on air and water transport. The Russian, Indian and Pakistani military aviation units are now fully deployed and operational, but are not yet cleared by the United Nations Secretariat for night operations. The force riverine unit has proved effective in deploying joint monitoring teams and force protection elements along the Nile within its operational range of 100 kilometres from its base. On 17 August, unidentified gunmen fired at a boat belonging to the United Nations riverine unit, which was transporting a joint monitoring team near Malakal. Two Indian soldiers and one SAF national monitor were injured. I am very concerned about this instance of deliberate targeting of UNMIS personnel, which UNMIS considers a serious violation of the ceasefire.

30. As at 4 September, UNMIS had chaired 35 meetings of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. Despite slow progress on a number of issues, the Committee continues to provide a useful forum for open and results-oriented discussion. After a

long delay, both parties have now submitted to the Committee information on the structure of their respective forces. Upon completion of analysis of those data, the information may significantly assist in the monitoring and verification of SAF and SPLA strength and disposition of forces.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

31. Although the Northern and Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions have been set up to lead and implement the interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, overall progress in the implementation and preparation of the multi-year disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been slow. The Commissions continued to need capable and motivated staff, as well as adequate budgets for their operations, in order to boost their capacities. However, the absence of some key decision-making national bodies, particularly the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, continued to limit the authority of the Commissions.

32. In the course of June, the SPLA forced civilian disarmament campaign met with some violent resistance in Jonglei State. In response, UNMIS, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led efforts to support the civilian disarmament programme in Akobo county, in order to promote non-coercive disarmament. UNMIS also resumed training support for 420 SPLA data collectors for the registration of SPLA troops, and has offered similar training support to SAF for the other armed groups aligned with it. In the meantime, 650 demobilized child combatants from SPLA were reunified with their families.

33. During the reporting period, the Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, with the support of UNMIS, demobilized and provided reinsertion support to 122 women and disabled ex-combatants from SAF-aligned other armed groups.

Electoral assistance

34. Security Council resolution 1590 (2005) mandated UNMIS to provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to support their preparations for and conduct of elections and referendums provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During the reporting period, UNMIS completed an initial assessment of electoral legislation and initiated discussions with parliamentarians, National Electoral Commissioners, the Registrar for Political Parties, political party leaders and civil society representatives. Recruitment for the UNMIS Electoral Unit is ongoing. The Unit will provide capacity-building and sustainable technical assistance to the National Electoral Commission, serve as focal point for electoral matters and coordinate international assistance to the electoral process.

Police

35. As at 1 September, UNMIS had deployed 666 United Nations police officers from 42 countries, who are currently stationed at 21 team sites, representing over 90 per cent of the authorized strength. Following agreement with the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), United Nations police officers are now working alongside the local police leadership in the areas of Juba and Kadugli.

36. On the recommendation of UNMIS, SSPS established the Police Development Committee in May to formulate policy and coordinate capacity-building efforts. The Inspector-General of Police chairs the Committee, which includes representatives of SPLM, the Government of National Unity and international agencies. Also, with UNMIS support, the Committee has drafted a framework and action plan for community policing in Juba. The UNMIS police component has drafted a code of conduct for the Sudan police, which is awaiting approval, and is prepared to play a leading role in SSPS officer training, providing an initial pool of 34 trainers for this purpose. SSPS has also approved an UNMIS proposal to develop a system intended to identify and register all SSPS personnel and issue each with an identification card. The implementation of this project began in June with the registration of senior SSPS officials, and as at 1 September almost 2,000 police officers had been registered. At the national level, UNMIS and other United Nations agencies are planning to begin human rights training for Government of National Unity police in Khartoum in September 2006. In the meantime, the Mission will continue its discussions with the Government of National Unity to identify other opportunities to assist the police in northern Sudan.

Human rights

37. The parties made little progress in establishing human rights commissions called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On 27 June, President Kiir of southern Sudan issued a decree naming five members of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, though the Commission itself does not yet formally exist. President Kiir asked the designated Commissioners to collaborate in finalizing the necessary legislation. In response to this development, UNMIS organized a workshop for the designated Commissioners to familiarize them with relevant human rights issues. At the national level, however, the National Assembly did not consider a draft act to establish the National Human Rights Commission before its three-month recess, which began in July. During the reporting period, UNMIS organized a workshop with the Advisory Council for Human Rights in which civil society groups called for amendments to the draft act, and another one with the National Assembly's Human Rights Standing Committee on international human rights treaties to which the Sudan is a party. In August, in cooperation with the Khartoum State police, UNMIS organized a series of workshops on human rights and law enforcement aimed at introducing and promoting international human rights standards within the national police force.

Rule of law

38. During the period under review, UNMIS assisted the Government of Southern Sudan authorities in preparing a training programme for corrections staff in southern Sudan, and in Rumbek, from 18 to 27 July, trained 100 Government of Southern Sudan corrections officers in the United Nations standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. On 26 July, UNDP and UNMIS trained 250 police officers in Juba on the topic "Rule of law principles and the criminal justice chain". The Government of Southern Sudan has requested UNMIS to co-locate corrections experts in major prisons in order to provide advice and training to local staff. UNMIS will need to second 25 prison experts from Member States to meet that request. UNDP has also conducted capacity-building activities for national rule-of-law institutions and actors, including the organization of three study tours for

members of the National Judicial Services Commission. Through the Government of Southern Sudan Budget Sector Working Group, UNMIS and UNDP helped the Government to plan and budget for rule-of-law institutions up to 2009.

Public information

39. UNMIS Radio started broadcasting in Juba on 30 June. The new station, Miraya ("Mirror") FM, broadcasts continuously and airs news bulletins in English, Arabic and Juba Arabic, which are updated three times per day. The Government of Southern Sudan has approved the roll-out of Miraya FM throughout southern Sudan, and UNMIS now plans to complete coverage of the largest population centres in southern Sudan by the end of the year. However, the Khartoum authorities continued their opposition to UNMIS Radio broadcasting in the North, despite the obligation under the status-of-forces agreement to allow it to broadcast countrywide.

40. In July, UNMIS attended the Joint Media Commission's first meeting since August 2005. The meeting discussed dissemination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including by using UNMIS materials for print, radio and television. However, no concrete decisions were taken. UNMIS obtained buildings for outreach centres in Kadugli and Malakal and is negotiating for outreach centres in Juba and Khartoum. UNMIS also continued to support AU in its efforts to disseminate the Darfur Peace Agreement in Darfur through workshops, website support and the production of radio programmes.

Humanitarian assistance

41. The humanitarian situation in southern Sudan remains stable and has led to increased activity and optimism among the international aid community. Between January and early June this year, international assistance contributed to the construction or repair of 370 kilometres of road. This in turn has supported the return of over 10,000 refugees to southern Sudan and the delivery of food aid to 5 million people, as well as polio immunization for 4.8 million children. While activities are temporarily restricted by seasonal rains at the moment, they are expected to resume at normal levels by October or November.

42. In Darfur, however, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May. Where reliable access exists, the humanitarian community continues to deliver a strong multisectoral programme, helping to maintain the gains in health, nutrition, water and sanitation that it has achieved since August 2004. However, reduced access in other areas, increased violence towards humanitarian actors and a weakening of the position of AMIS are beginning to reverse these hard-won humanitarian gains. During the reporting period, humanitarian access reached its lowest levels since 2003 (below 60 per cent). Populations are suffering from both the increased instability and violence and the diminished ability of humanitarian workers to reach them. Perceptions of AMIS partiality have reduced the confidence of internally displaced persons in the AU Mission, leading to reduced security as AMIS withdrew from several camps. Humanitarian needs are likely to increase in the short term, as displacements have reduced planting this season, leading to a much-diminished harvest in November.

43. The Government continued to restrict humanitarian access in Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref States. While bilateral arrangements have facilitated access for some agencies, further restrictions were being imposed towards the end of August. Access

for humanitarian personnel in Abyei improved, despite ongoing restrictions on the movement of UNMIS monitors. The lack of a civil administration in Abyei continued to delay the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery programmes, increasing the risk of a humanitarian crisis.

Protection of civilians

44. During the reporting period, police in Northern Sudan carried out raids on camps for internally displaced persons, relocation sites and squatter areas around Khartoum. Such raids are regularly accompanied by violence, abuse and extortions. On 16 and 17 August, authorities evicted some 12,000 internally displaced persons in Dar Assalam, south of Khartoum, and demolished about 3,500 houses in a day. Reports suggest that authorities killed and injured an unknown number of internally displaced persons during the operations. UNMIS, which to date has been denied all access to the area, is pressing for immediate high-level Government measures to address the needs of the relocated populations and to prevent further abuses. In this connection, I would like to remind the Sudanese authorities of the willingness and capability of United Nations agencies and partners to assist them in planning the relocation process for communities, including the proper preparation of sites and provision of services.

45. In southern Sudan, enhanced cooperation between agencies and UNMIS helped ensure coordinated responses to protection issues arising from ongoing insecurity. For example, when civilians were attacked and looted in Jonglei by militia members resisting forcible disarmament, UNMIS rapidly deployed inter-agency assessment teams from Malakal and Juba.

46. The inclusion of children in armed forces in the Sudan remains a grave concern, as described in my report to the Security Council of 17 August (S/2006/662). In Southern Sudan, child soldiers are most often associated with other armed groups.

Returns

47. During the reporting period, returns to the three areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) and the south dwindled as the rains made many roads impassable; small numbers of returnees are still arriving by barge. However, the returns are likely to resume on a large scale in October. The Government of Southern Sudan intends to organize the return of as many as possible of the 680,000 people who are already registered with State authorities to return. In response to the ambitious plans of the Government of Southern Sudan, the United Nations provided technical support for organized returns to ensure they are conducted according to international standards. Providing effective and timely reintegration and recovery assistance to communities in areas with large numbers of returnees remains a critical challenge.

48. In Darfur, the security situation did not allow for returns. Instead, UNMIS activities focused on preparedness for return contingencies, enabling agencies to respond effectively should the situation change. Existing mechanisms, particularly agreements with the Government, will remain central tools for ensuring that any returns that take place do so under conditions of voluntariness, safety and dignity.

Mine action

49. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to constitute a major threat to the population in many parts of the Sudan, as well as to United Nations staff and humanitarian personnel operating on the ground. However, UNMIS mine action teams have made major progress in demining activities and mine education. To date, 7 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas have been cleared, and some 2,100 anti-personnel mines, over 900 anti-tank mines and some 270,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small-arms ammunition have been destroyed. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund have provided mine-risk education to more than 834,000 people. UNMIS has provided briefings on landmine safety to over 2,400 staff working with the Mission or other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, while 179 staff have been trained as trainers.

50. UNMIS mine action teams prioritized the clearing of humanitarian routes in the Nuba Mountains, Juba, Rumbek, Wau, Yei, Malakal, Ed Damazin and Darfur. Over 1,200 kilometres of roads have been verified or cleared for emergency deployment and aid delivery. The road from Kadugli to Fama, closed for 16 years, can now be reopened. However, as these efforts have come to a halt during the rainy season, the focus has shifted to the recruitment and training of deminers. Three UNMIS demining contingents from Egypt (Kadugli), Kenya (Wau) and Bangladesh (Juba), have commenced operations. Pakistani units have been issued with provisional accreditation and are awaiting deployment to Kurmuk by the end of August. Cambodian units in Malakal are going through in-country training for final accreditation and are expected to be fully operational by the end of the rainy season.

51. The National Mine Action Authority, launched in March 2006, met for the first time in August and approved the National Mine Action Strategic Framework. UNMIS has supported and implemented several national capacity-development activities of the Authority, including an eight-week training course for Joint Integrated Demining Unit personnel and seven national mine-action capacity-development courses to develop the technical and managerial skills of national and international mine-action staff.

Economic recovery and reconstruction

52. The economy continues to grow rapidly, while inflation remains subdued. Real GDP growth is projected at 12 per cent for 2006, strengthened by higher oil receipts and buoyant activity in the non-oil sector. However, a decrease in oil production during the first half of the year caused both the fiscal and the external current account balances to deteriorate. Average inflation fell from 8.5 per cent in December 2005 to 5.4 per cent in June 2006. The favourable inflation performance is reflected in lower food prices, among other indicators. Unfortunately, most private-sector gains remain confined to Khartoum, and benefits are reaped primarily by the elite and higher income earners. The United Nations, the World Bank and the African Development Bank initiated the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission under the Darfur Peace Agreement in The Hague on 21 and 22 June. The Joint Assessment Mission is designed to provide rapid implementation in relation to urgent needs, and better planning and coordination of longer-term development requirements, based on the identified needs of Darfurians. However, the escalation of violence in Darfur severely impeded the work of the Mission.

53. Donor support continues to lag behind needs with respect to humanitarian requirements. By the end of August 2006, donor pledges met only 56 per cent ($896.5 million) of identified humanitarian work-plan requirements. With respect to recovery and development, while donor commitments lagged, participants at the first Sudan Consortium meeting in March 2006 agreed that a principal challenge has been the slow disbursements of paid-in contributions through the multi-donor trust funds. The World Bank structure and administration of the trust funds have proved ill-suited to meet immediate post-conflict requirements. This has been compounded by the fact that the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan is still nascent. Since the Oslo conference, approximately $430 million of the $2.6 billion needed for post-conflict reconstruction, as identified by the Joint Assessment Mission, has been committed. With respect to the multi-donor trust funds, less than $12 million had been disbursed for programming by the end of July 2006.

Gender

54. While some progress has been made in opening space for discussion of gender issues since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many challenges to the political and economic empowerment of women in the Sudan remain. UNMIS began drafting a training manual for women candidates for the national elections, and began working with police officers in Southern Kordofan on improving sensitivity to victims of gender-based violence. Within UNMIS, the Gender Unit distributed copies of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13).

HIV/AIDS

55. The UNMIS HIV/AIDS Unit continued providing voluntary counselling and testing services, induction courses and HIV sensitization for peacekeeping contingents in the sectors. The Unit also trained 32 SPLA HIV/AIDS change agents in Rumbek as part of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. In addition, awareness training reached some 1,200 SPLA members, and about 1,000 internally displaced persons in Lologo way station, in Juba. The Unit assisted the Sudan National AIDS Programme in drafting a project proposal for HIV/AIDS awareness among SAF members.

Conduct and discipline

56. The UNMIS Conduct and Discipline Unit continues to be engaged in active prevention, enforcement and outreach activities to ensure that all Mission personnel comply with the United Nations code of conduct for the Sudan. All new staff now receive extensive induction training on the code of conduct and on sexual exploitation and abuse. During the reporting period, UNMIS also launched a public information strategy on United Nations standards of conduct and developed and implemented a standard operating procedure for reporting misconduct. As a result of an investigation, one staff member was dismissed for sexual exploitation in connection with an incident that occurred in 2005. As at 28 August, 33 similar cases were under active investigation; in 8 of those cases, reports are being awaited from the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

Status-of-forces agreement

57. There is a major concern about several apparent breaches of the Government's commitments under the status-of-forces agreement. During the reporting period, SAF personnel continued to prevent UNMIS movement north of Abyei, restricting the United Nations monitoring to only 20 per cent of the sector, which is also in violation of the Government's obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the same time, the Government continues to arrest and detain national UNMIS staff, in violation of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the status-of-forces agreement. The obstacles to clearing UNMIS materiel through customs and the refusal to allow UNMIS Radio to broadcast in northern Sudan are also in breach of obligations under the status-of-forces agreement.

IV. Observations

58. One year after the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, the parties have made progress, albeit on a limited scale, in carrying out their commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While they are observing their security commitments reasonably well, the implementation of several other major provisions of the Agreement has fallen behind schedule. Disappointingly, the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement appears to be selective. The parties have not been able to resolve some important contentious issues, and little progress has been made in the crucial areas of power- and wealth-sharing which together form the cornerstone of the Agreement, including in respect of Abyei, oil revenues, the north-south border and other armed groups. In addition, the parties have so far done too little to begin preparing for national elections. They should be reminded that none of the commitments enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are optional. The parties must meet all their obligations promptly and fully.

59. While various ceasefire bodies envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are working well, the ongoing restrictions imposed on the activities of UNMIS monitors in and around Abyei constitute a clear violation of the Agreement. This is of particular concern because the inability of UNMIS to operate properly in northern Abyei only heightens suspicions between the parties. It is also unacceptable that the Ceasefire Political Commission has failed to reach a political compromise on this pivotal issue. I urge that body to resolve the matter expeditiously.

60. The deliberate attack by unidentified armed men on a joint monitoring team on 17 August near Malakal is particularly alarming. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee is investigating the incident, including the allegations about the involvement of other armed groups. I call on the two parties to ensure that the perpetrators of the crime are identified and held to account, and that no such incidents occur in the future.

61. The people of the Sudan have high expectations of peace dividends under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To date, those expectations have not been met. The United Nations has expanded humanitarian activities and increased recovery interventions considerably, with only limited resources at its disposal. However, accelerated implementation of recovery and development programmes, in particular through multi-donor trust funds, will be critical in order to help build public support

for the peace, especially in the south and the three areas. At the same time, donors will need to make good on the commitments they made at the Oslo pledging conference in 2005. I renew my call to the international community to fulfil its pledges in a timely and effective manner.

62. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is entering a new and challenging phase. In the months ahead, the parties must make substantial progress on the difficult tasks related to security-sector reform, police reform and restructuring, preparing for the return of internally displaced persons, the national census and future elections, while continuing active and determined disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to reduce the scourge of small arms. I call on the international community to support the Sudanese people as they confront these new challenges, and to lend financial, technical and political assistance to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement agenda.

63. It is clear that implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains a daunting challenge. There can be no harvest without planting; and if the international community wishes the Sudan to reap the harvest of a durable peace by the end of the interim period envisaged in the Agreement, everything possible should be done to perform the task of planting the seeds of sustainable peace and development.

64. The Sudan's own history confirms that peace is indivisible. The progress that is being made in the talks on eastern Sudan is encouraging, and I hope that they will lead to a full and lasting agreement. However, efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will prove inadequate until durable peace also comes to Darfur. Conversely, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains the bedrock on which the Darfur Peace Agreement, however unsteady it may appear now, could be built. The people and the leaders of the Sudan, with the active support of the international community, must tend to both if the country is to finally emerge from conflict and instability.

65. I sincerely hope that the leaders of the Sudan are fully aware of the possible consequences of their negative reaction to the generous proposals of the international community with regard to Darfur, which are based on the Darfur Peace Agreement and the joint position of the African Union and the United Nations concerning the strengthening of AMIS and the transition to the United Nations. There cannot be a lasting solution in Darfur through coercion and violence. The United Nations is therefore prepared to seek the political path, as was agreed by the Sudanese themselves at Abuja. I am ready to continue to engage all parties involved in order to pursue this path. The Security Council has a key role to play in this process, but its effectiveness will depend on its ability to speak and act in complete unity. Ultimately, however, the leaders in Khartoum bear full responsibility for the route they may finally choose.

66. In conclusion, I wish to thank my Special Representative and all United Nations staff for their tireless efforts to help bring peace to the people of the Sudan. In this context, I recommend that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNMIS for a period of 12 months, until 24 September 2007.

Annex

Military and police strength as at 27 August 2006

	Military component									
	Observers		*Troops*		*Staff officers*		*Total*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Argentina									0	11
Australia	0	6			3	6	3	12	2	8
Austria						2		2		
Bangladesh	0	23	0	1 501	0	26	0	1 548	3	26
Belgium	0	4					0	4		
Benin	0	7					0	7		
Bolivia	0	15					0	15		
Botswana	0	5					0	5		
Bosnia									1	1
Brazil	0	24					0	24	0	3
Burkina Faso	0	7					0	7		
Cambodia	0	15	0	135	0	1	0	151		
Canada	2	23			1	5	3	28	0	2
China	0	15	7	428		8	7	451	2	13
Croatia					0	3	0	3		
Denmark					0	6	0	6		
Ecuador	0	20					0	20		
Egypt	0	21	16	780		19	16	820		
El Salvador	0	5					0	5	1	5
Fiji	0	8					0	8	0	5
Finland					0	2	0	2	0	2
Gabon	0	10					0	10		
Gambia									4	15
Germany	0	34			0	3	0	37	0	4
Ghana									6	35
Greece	0	4			0	2	0	6		
Guatemala	0	8					0	8		
Guinea	0	16					0	16		
India	0	26	4	2 571		25	4	2 622	1	29
Indonesia	0	13					0	13		
Jamaica									2	5
Jordan	0	15			0	8	0	23	0	10

	Military component									
	Observers		Troops		Staff officers		Total		Civilian police	
Country	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Kenya	0	10	32	786		6	33	802	1	20
Kyrgyzstan	3	7					3	7	0	1
Malawi	0	7			0	1	0	8		
Malaysia	0	10			0	3	0	13	0	10
Mali	0	15					0	15		
Mongolia	0	2					0	2		
Mozambique	0	3					0	1		
Namibia	0	10					0	10	0	1
Nepal	2	8	2	221		4	4	233	1	54
Netherlands	1	13			2	1	15	2	10	
New Zealand	0	2			0	1	0	3		
Nigeria	0	8					0	8	4	45
Norway	1	19				7	1	26	0	4
Pakistan	0	22	0	1 542	0	23	0	1 587	0	44
Paraguay	0	10					0	10		
Peru	0	17					0	17		
Philippines	0	20					0	20	0	55
Poland	0	2					0	2		
Republic of Korea	0	7					0	7		
Republic of Moldova	0	2					0	2		
Romania	0	12					0	12		
Russian Federation	0	15	0	120	0	2	0	15	0	13
Rwanda	0	18	0	254	0	2	0	274	0	20
Samoa									0	17
Sri Lanka	0	6					0	6	0	23
Sweden	0	3			0	1	0	4	0	8
Thailand	1	14					1	14		
Turkey					0	4	0	4	0	28
Uganda	0	10					0	10	2	17
Ukraine	0	13					0	13	1	23
United Kingdom					0	3	0	3		
United Republic of Tanzania	1	19					1	19	0	3
Uruguay									0	2
United States of America									2	5

	Military component								Civilian police	
	Observers		Troops		Staff officers		Total			
Country	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Vanuatu									0	6
Yemen	0	20					0	20	0	3
Zambia	0	15	13	325		7	13	338	0	19
Zimbabwe	2	19					2	19	0	26
Total per gender	**13**	**682**	**75**	**8 653**	**4**	**182**	**92**	**9 516**	**41**	**625**
Total	**695**		**8 727**		**186**		**9 608**		**666**	



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General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Item 13 of the provisional agenda*
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 11 September 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I transmit to you herewith a list of Israeli acts of aggression against Lebanon that took place between 9 September 2006 and 11 September 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/61/150.

06-51873 (E) 140906 190906

Annex to the identical letters dated 11 September 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Subject: Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 0800 hours on 7 September 2006 to 0800 hours on 8 September 2006

Air violations

There were seven air violations reported by enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft and warplanes over various Lebanese areas, involving a total of six reconnaissance aircraft and two warplanes.

Land violations

At 0930 hours two enemy Israeli tanks advanced on the northern half of the occupied town of Ghajar and fired several shells directly at former resistance emplacements on the edge of town (on the northern side inside liberated Lebanese territory). An enemy bulldozer worked on raising earthen berms at the northern and north-eastern edges of the town.

It should be noted that the air blockade ended as of 1800 hours on 7 September 2006, while the sea blockade continues.

Subject: Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 0800 hours on 8 September 2006 to 0800 hours on 9 September 2006

Air violations

There were three air violations reported by reconnaissance aircraft over various Lebanese areas, involving a total of three reconnaissance aircraft.

Land violations

At 1600 hours, on the outskirts of the town of Marouahine near the Balat outpost, a patrol of the enemy Israeli forces proceeded to arrest Ali Ubayd and led him into occupied Palestinian territory through the Marouahine gate. He was released at 2000 hours.

At 1615 hours, enemy Israeli forces arrested the following people at the school for the disabled in the town of Aaita al-Chaab: Tahir Salim Tahini, Muhammad Husayn Surur, Kamil Mahmud Harisi, Hasan Fayez Daqduq (of Public Security) and Ali Ahmad Mar i Qasim and led them to an unknown location. They were released on the morning of 9 September 2006.

In the wake of the Israeli enemy's use of cluster bombs against residential areas during its attacks on Lebanon many of these bombs have been reported to have exploded, resulting in injury to four persons during the period in question.

At 0900 hours, on the outskirts of the town of Al-Bazouriye, while 'Isa Wadi (a Palestinian) was working in an orchard, a cluster bomb exploded. He was slightly injured.

At 1200 hours, in the town of Jouaiya, a cluster bomb exploded, resulting in injury to a young boy, Abbas Faqih, in his left hand (his condition is not serious).

At 1715 hours, in the town of Aarab Salim, while Nasir Haydar and his 12-year-old son Husayn were burning dry brush behind their home, a cluster bomb exploded, resulting in slight injury to both.

Subject: Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 0800 hours on 9 September 2006 to 0800 hours on 10 September 2006

Air violations

There was one air violation reported by a reconnaissance aircraft:

Between 2020 hours and 2255 hours, an enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Insariye and Aadaisse areas.

Sea violations

At 1315 hours, an Israeli military launch fired several rounds of medium-weapons fire in the open sea off Ras al-Naqoura.

At 2114 hours, an Israeli military launch fired several rounds of medium-weapons fire at a fishing vessel in the open sea (inside Lebanese territorial waters) off Ras al-Naqoura.

At 2259 hours, an Israeli military launch fired several rounds of medium-weapons fire at a fishing vessel in the open sea (inside Lebanese territorial waters) off Ras al-Naqoura.

In the wake of the Israeli enemy's use of cluster bombs against residential areas during its attacks on Lebanon many of these bombs have been reported to have exploded, resulting in injury to two persons during the period in question:

At 0810 hours, in Yohmor al-Nabatiye, while Husayn 'Ali Ahmad was renovating his house, a cluster bomb left behind by the Israeli aggression exploded, causing him multiple injuries.

At 1130 hours, in Aazze near Tyre, while Salih Karshat was working in an orchard, a cluster bomb left behind by the Israeli aggression exploded, causing him multiple injuries.

Subject: Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 0800 hours on 10 September 2006 to 0800 hours on 11 September 2006

Air violations

There were three air violations reported by enemy Israeli warplanes and reconnaissance aircraft over various Lebanese areas, involving a total of two reconnaissance aircraft and four warplanes:

At 0858 hours a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre in an easterly direction and circled overland over the regions of Al-Jiye, Al-Saadiyat and Sidon and then over regions of the South. It left Lebanese airspace at 1115 hours over Al-Naqoura.

At 1100 hours, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre in an easterly direction and circled over the southern regions, leaving Lebanese airspace at 1330 hours over Aalma al-Chaab.

At 2000 hours, four enemy Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace over Marjaayoun in a northerly direction and circled over regions of the sea off Tyre in an easterly direction and circled over regions of the South, Al-Chouf and Chekka, leaving Lebanese airspace on the same date at 2030 hours over the sea off Al-Naqoura.

Land violations

At 1520 hours, an enemy Israeli bulldozer and minesweeper in the area of Ghajar (the northern side of the Lebanese part) worked on constructing an outpost of its own in a spot where Hezbollah had been positioned previously.

Sea violations

At 0730 hours, an enemy Israeli military launch fired several rounds of medium-weapons fire in the open sea off Ras al-Naqoura at a fishing vessel (inside Lebanese territorial waters).

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is my second report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It follows my report of 18 August 2006 (S/2006/670), which focused on steps taken until that date, and measures required to consolidate the fragile cessation of hostilities. The present report provides a more comprehensive assessment of the political situation, in addition to an update on all steps taken to implement resolution 1701 (2006). I submit the former in response to paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the resolution.

2. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Council sets out the following principles and elements on which a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution would be based:

(a) Full respect for the Blue Line by both Lebanon and Israel;

(b) Security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL);

(c) Full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that, pursuant to the Lebanese Cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

(d) No foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;

(e) No sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;

(f) Provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession.

The Council also highlighted the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shab'a Farms area, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon as important steps. Additional matters to be addressed include the unconditional release of the captured Israeli soldiers and the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel.

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II. Background

A. Outcome of the war

3. As of 31 August 2006, official Lebanese figures showed that 1,187 people had died and 4,092 had been injured in Lebanon as a result of the conflict. Many of these victims were children. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that one million Lebanese were displaced between 12 July and 14 August, with some 735,000 seeking shelter within Lebanon and 230,000 outside; this included the secondary displacement of approximately 16,000 Palestinian refugees. The cessation of hostilities on 14 August triggered a massive and speedy return of internally displaced persons and refugees back to their areas of origin. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), within days of the ceasefire some 90 per cent of those displaced in Lebanon during the hostilities — around 900,000 or one quarter of the population — returned to their homes or were staying nearby. At the end of August, it was estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 people remained internally displaced.

4. In Lebanon, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that the conflict caused physical damage amounting to $3.6 billion, including the destruction of 80 bridges, 600 km of roads, 900 factories, markets, farms and other commercial buildings, 31 airports, ports, water- and sewage-treatment plants, dams and electrical plants, and 25 fuel stations. Unemployment is currently as high as 75 per cent in some parts of the country. An estimated 15,000 homes were destroyed.

5. On the Israeli side, from 12 July until 14 August, 43 Israeli civilians and 117 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers were killed. In addition to large numbers of people treated for shock and anxiety, 33 Israelis were wounded seriously and 68 moderately. During that time, 3,970 rockets landed in Israel, 901 of them in urban areas; 300,000 residents were displaced and more than a million were forced to live for some of the time in shelters, according to official Israeli figures.

6. Since the cessation of hostilities went into effect, the nature of the humanitarian response in Lebanon has seen a rapid transition to early recovery activities and short-term intervention to provide assistance to the large numbers of returnees. The revised United Nations flash appeal, launched in Stockholm on 31 August, has put the emphasis on the clearance of mines and unexploded ordinance, emergency health and education needs, and water and sanitation, with the vast part of project implementation to take place in the coming six weeks. As of 31 August, 30 to 50 per cent of households in conflict-affected areas remained in need of food assistance; 120,000 people in southern Beirut and 30,000 in schools and other public institutions also needed food assistance, although immediate demands have thus far been largely met.[1] Humanitarian activities were and continue

[1] Concerns also remain as to the possible impact of the shortage of some essential drugs and the effects of the interruption of general, reproductive, vaccination and child health services; a United Nations assessment of more than 400 health facilities in conflict-affected areas found that 26 per cent of all facilities were not functioning due to physical damage, lack of staff or lack of accessibility. A large number of schools were also damaged or destroyed. Initial United Nations inter-agency field assessments in the south show local communities have set schooling as a priority since without major efforts the school year will be jeopardized.

to be coordinated through clusters led by United Nations agencies and partners and delivered via humanitarian hubs (Tyre and Saida).

7. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, the Government of Lebanon, with the full support of the United Nations system, civil society and international institutions, launched a series of preliminary needs assessments and developed a strategy to address early recovery needs, which laid the basis for longer-term reconstruction. The strategy was presented at the international donor conference held in Stockholm on 31 August, along with the United Nations revised flash appeal. More than $900 million was pledged at the meeting to support the Government's short-term efforts.[2]

8. In Israel, the existing well developed infrastructure of bomb shelters meant that displacement remained relatively limited. Many affected Israeli civilians moved southwards and were cared for by relatives or friends. As a result, the humanitarian situation has remained under control. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Government pledged to make the rehabilitation of Haifa and the north a central goal of Israel's priorities for the near future. On 20 August, the Cabinet decided to establish a special Committee for Strengthening Haifa and the North; Israel's Chief Coordinator for the Reconstruction of Public Infrastructure in the North told ministers that damaged schools would be repaired by the start of the school year on 3 September. The Government has also paid compensation to business owners and families and opened treatment centres for those suffering from shock.

B. United Nations missions to the region

9. Since the crisis in the Middle East erupted with the outbreak of hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel on 12 July, I have maintained regular contact with the Prime Ministers of Lebanon and of Israel, as well as other relevant actors and concerned parties. I have also despatched a number of high-level missions to the region.

10. Given the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), I decided to visit the region myself. I attended the extraordinary ministerial-level meeting of the European Union in Brussels on 25 August, and travelled to Lebanon, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Spain in subsequent days, meeting Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and other senior officials. In addition, I kept in close contact by telephone with those senior officials and the representatives of other concerned parties and relevant actors throughout my mission. I discerned broad support for the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and was encouraged by the general commitment to restoring security and stability across the Middle East. I am pleased to note that my efforts appear to have contributed to securing the commitments of

[2] To date, $92.3 million has been committed against the $96.5 million required under the revised Lebanon flash appeal, with an additional $13.4 million in pledges also recorded. While the initiatives under the Government of Lebanon's early recovery strategy are implemented over the next 4 to 6 months, the Government will also finalize a number of in-depth social and economic impact assessments and develop its long-term reconstruction programme on the basis of the economic and social reform agenda it had prepared before the conflict.

several troop-contributing countries to help stabilize the situation as part of UNIFIL, and to lifting the full aerial and sea blockade Israel had imposed on Lebanon.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Respect for the Blue Line

11. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 1701 (2006), the Council reiterated its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line. In paragraph 8 of the same resolution, the Council also affirmed full respect for the Blue Line as one of the principles and elements of a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution. As I have outlined in a number of reports to the Council, both sides in the past have failed to respect the Blue Line. Since it was drawn by the United Nations in 2000, the Blue Line has remained tense, with violations from both sides.

12. Since my previous report of 18 August (S/2006/670), the parties have largely complied with the cessation of hostilities. UNIFIL has, however, observed numerous minor incidents and violations in its area of operation between the Litani River and the Blue Line. These have primarily been ground violations related to the fortifying of IDF positions and the technical fence. IDF has also continued to resupply and rotate troops inside Lebanon. UNIFIL has taken particular note of daily Israeli air incursions over Lebanese air space. From the Lebanese side, shepherds have resumed their practice of crossing the Blue Line in the Shab'a farms vicinity. There has been little visible activity by Hizbollah in the UNIFIL area of operations, other than some reported attempts to salvage equipment from its previous positions and transport it northwards.

13. On the whole, the ground violations have not been of an offensive and hostile character and the parties seem determined to uphold the agreement. There was, however, one severe violation of the cessation of hostilities, when Israeli forces carried out a raid in eastern Lebanon on 19 August. The assessment that the parties seem generally determined to uphold the cessation of hostilities converges with the fact that both the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have assured me of their commitment to fully respect the Blue Line. In order to aid the parties in honouring their obligation to respect the Blue Line in its entirety, UNIFIL intends to place visible markers on the ground along its full length.

B. Security arrangements

14. On 27 July, the Government of Lebanon decided "to extend its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese State". This decision provides the necessary basis for the establishment of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani River, as one of the elements of a permanent ceasefire set out in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Both the Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon have expressed their agreement with this principle to me. UNIFIL is now assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in taking steps towards the establishment of this area following a full withdrawal of IDF from Lebanese territory.

15. Concerning security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, the Government of Lebanon, in its Cabinet decision of 27 July, called "on the United Nations, in cooperation with the relevant parties, to undertake the necessary measures to once again put into effect the Armistice Agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel in 1949, and to ensure adherence to the provisions of that agreement, as well as to explore possible amendments to or development of the said provisions, as necessary". IDF, for its part, suggested that UNIFIL set up a tripartite body, modelled after the current tripartite coordination mechanism, to address security matters on a long-term basis. UNIFIL has asked the parties to provide more detailed suggestions in writing, on the basis of which UNIFIL will prepare a draft proposal for consideration by the Governments of Lebanon and Israel.

16. On the ground, significant progress continues to be made as regards the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of LAF. UNIFIL continues to coordinate a gradual IDF withdrawal from and LAF deployment into south Lebanon. Since my previous report of 18 August (S/2006/670), senior officers of IDF and LAF have met with the Force Commander of UNIFIL on six occasions to facilitate this process through the procedures and plan of withdrawal agreed in mid-August. IDF has divided the occupied area into 16 sectors and sub-sectors, and had vacated 9 of these by 7 September, with withdrawal from the others projected before the end of September 2006. In total, IDF to date has vacated approximately 65 per cent of the area it occupied when the cessation of hostilities went into effect. UNIFIL established checkpoints and carried out intensive patrolling to verify that there was no IDF presence in these locations, and LAF deployed in the vacated areas after a 24-hour period. On 31 August, LAF deployed for the first time along the eastern part of the Blue Line and has now established some permanent positions there.

17. A general understanding has been reached that IDF will completely withdraw from Lebanese territory once UNIFIL strength is increased to 5,000 troops and the Lebanese Army is ready to deploy at the full strength of 15,000 troops. According to Lebanese military authorities at the time of preparation of the present report LAF supported by UNIFIL had deployed close to 10,000 troops south of the Litani River. I expect this process to be completed in the coming weeks, which would further stabilize the situation. The blueprint for the induction of LAF in south Lebanon, as presented by the Lebanese Army Command, envisions four brigades in the areas between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and another brigade and two battalions in reserve north of the Litani River.

18. A planning and coordination mechanism has been established between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Ministry of Defence and Army Command to ensure ongoing effective cooperation on deployment and joint activities. In addition, a high-level security coordination mechanism has been created, at my behest, with the participation of, on the Lebanese side, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Commander of LAF, the head of the Internal Security Forces and my Personal Representative for Lebanon, as well as the UNIFIL Force Commander. LAF has also established a liaison cell in Tyre to interact with the various UNIFIL units and headquarters branches on the ground. I expect this liaison cell to co-locate with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura once IDF withdraws from the area.

with the Assistant Secretaries-General for Operations and Mission Support and the Military Adviser. On behalf of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and consistent with his political direction, the director of this cell will provide strategic military guidance and direction to the UNIFIL Force Commander. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is at present consulting with Member States to develop the structure and size of the strategic cell, which will be funded through the UNIFIL budget. The UNIFIL Force Commander, as head of mission, will continue to exercise operational authority in the field on my behalf and to exercise operational control over the military units assigned to UNIFIL. Force Commander Alain Pellegrini will remain in office until 17 February 2007 and will then be replaced by an Italian Force Commander.

C. Disarming armed groups

29. In its resolutions 1701 (2006), the Security Council envisaged the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of its resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State. Both the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel concur with the principle of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution.

30. I have provided details on the status of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in my previous reports on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and will provide a further update in my fourth semi-annual report in October 2006. I remain convinced that the disarming of Hizbollah and other militia should take place through a political process that will lead to the full restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority other than its own. The national dialogue has not managed so far to achieve a consensus on a political process and timeline for the full disarming of Hizbollah in the sense of an integration of its armed capacity into the Lebanese Armed Forces. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27 July 2006, will define such a political process.

31. The agreement reached in the national dialogue on the issue of Palestinian militias outside Palestinian refugee camps has been recognized as a significant and important step. But its implementation within the six-month period stipulated by the national dialogue (which ended on 30 August) has not yet been realized.

D. Foreign forces

32. In resolutions 1559 (2004), the Security Council envisaged that no foreign forces should be in Lebanon without the consent of the Government as an element underpinning a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution. As I have previously reported to the host of the ability of the United Nations to ascertain if the only foreign forces currently deployed in Lebanon are either those serving under the banner of UNIFIL or IDF troops whose full withdrawal I anticipate to take place in the coming week, as UNIFIL strength reaches 15,000 troops.

E. Arms embargo

29. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 1701 (2006), the Council called on the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon of arms or related material without its consent. The Council has asked UNIFIL "to assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request", in its efforts to implement this provision. It further decided, in paragraph 15 of the same resolution, that all States should take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, and the provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such items, except if authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. The imposition of such an arms embargo is fully consistent with the Lebanese Cabinet decision of 27 July 2006 that there shall be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State and is a measure that is inherently part of the security arrangements preventing a resumption of hostilities, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). In this context, I also note the provision of paragraph 15 of the same resolution and I urge all Member States to fully comply with it.

30. Both the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel are in agreement with this element underpinning a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution. Indeed, the United Nations has devoted considerable efforts to putting in place the necessary arrangements for such an embargo.

31. I note the assurances given to me by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic that, while the Syrian Arab Republic objects to the presence of foreign troops along the Syrian Arab Republic-Lebanese border, the Syrian Arab Republic would undertake all necessary measures to implement in full paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006). President Assad also told me that the Syrian Arab Republic would increase the number of border guards deployed and enhance their capacity through the provision of additional training and the supply of materiel, such as vehicles. He further said that the Syrian Arab Republic would be willing to establish liaison mechanisms with LAF, Lebanese border police and international personnel providing technical assistance to the Lebanese in order to set up an effective interdiction regime. President Assad also affirmed that the Syrian Arab Republic would be willing to establish, where possible, joint border patrols and control points with the Lebanese authorities. I have further been informed that the President has in the meantime requested the SAR military to deploy one additional battalion to the land border with Lebanon, and has indicated willingness to accept assistance from Germany.

32. The Lebanese authorities have meanwhile undertaken a variety of steps to enforce their monopoly on the control and legitimate use of force throughout Lebanon's territory. In order to enhance coordination among the concerned branches of the Lebanese security establishment, a high-level coordination mechanism has been established, as I have described above.

33. In a letter dated 5 September, the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Michel Sleiman, informed Force Commander UNIFIL General Alain Pellegrini about measures taken by LAF to secure the borders and prevent

unauthorized and illegitimate entry of arms and related materials into Lebanon. He specified that some 8,000 troops had been deployed along Lebanon's land border with the Syrian Arab Republic, and that similar measures had been taken along the 200 km of the coastline in order to secure the maritime border. He also provided maps indicating the deployment of the Army in these areas. The LAF Commander invited UNIFIL, including a team of experts, to visit these positions and suggest appropriate steps for improving the efficacy of these measures through the use of modern technology and training for the troops. He also inquired whether the United Nations could assist in providing LAF with the assets and equipment that could help in accomplishing this mission. In a letter dated 6 September, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities invited UNIFIL to visit Beirut International Airport to take stock of the existing security systems and procedures as well as the enhancements to airport security that have been or are being put in place.

34. In response to these letters, Germany, on a bilateral basis, has sent a small team of experts to provide technical assistance and review the measures put in place by the Lebanese authorities, offering advice on what is needed for their improvement. UNIFIL is dispatching its own team of military, police, customs and border experts to augment these efforts.

35. The Lebanese Council of Ministers decided on 4 September to task the Army to exercise control of the Lebanese territorial waters in the context of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1701 and, in that regard, to call on the support and technical assistance of UNIFIL. On that basis, the coordination and planning team engaged in discussions with the Lebanese military authorities and troop-contributing countries in order to define operational and coordination procedures for such maritime operations. On 6 September, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Siniora wrote to me to request the assistance of the United Nations in securing Lebanon's maritime border and maritime entry points into Lebanon. He specifically asked whether UNIFIL "could provide a naval task force that would help prevent the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into Lebanon, until such time that [Lebanon's] naval and security forces are able to fulfil these tasks on their own". While acknowledging that Lebanon's "current naval capabilities are too limited to effectively patrol Lebanon's 200 kilometres of coastline", the Prime Minister noted that United Nations maritime surveillance would be undertaken "in close coordination with the Lebanese Navy and armed forces". Prime Minister Siniora further wrote that it would be important that such maritime assistance "also include technical training of Lebanon's naval and other security personnel and, hopefully, the provision at a later date of marine and other equipment to upgrade Lebanon's capacity for effective and independent coastal monitoring and control".

36. In response to the request by Prime Minister Siniora, UNIFIL will establish a naval component that is projected to be in place within the coming weeks. Until all necessary arrangements are made and the UNIFIL maritime component can be deployed, interim measures have been put in place. Italy has agreed to lead an interim maritime task force on a bilateral basis with the Government of Lebanon, maintaining close coordination with UNIFIL, comprised of naval assets contributed by France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom on a non-reimbursable basis. At the same time, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is working on an urgent basis with Member States to plan, generate and deploy a maritime task force to UNIFIL to support the Lebanese naval and security forces. A large maritime element

presents a new challenge for a peacekeeping operation and will require a degree of flexibility, including as regards arrangements for the reimbursement of contributing Member States. It is expected that the maritime force will comprise at least four frigates forming an outer screen for maritime surveillance and interdiction operations. A screen of smaller vessels, in particular corvettes and fast patrol boats able to intercept suspect vessels, will be deployed closer inshore and operate in close cooperation with LAF.

F. Land mines and cluster bombs

37. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council envisaged that all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession be provided to the United Nations in order to enable a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution. IDF has been handing over some maps to UNIFIL as it withdraws from particular locations. The Israeli authorities have assured UNIFIL that all relevant maps of landmines and unexploded ordnance in their possession will be handed over on completion of the withdrawal.

38. I wish to emphasize the danger that unexploded ordnance represents and the harm that has been caused by such material. The extent of contamination south of the Litani River from unexploded ordnance, namely from cluster bomblets and sub-munitions, has become clearer since my last report and unexploded ordnance clearly presents a significant challenge to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). As of 8 September 2006, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, in conjunction with the Lebanese national demining office, have identified 481 individual cluster strike locations, each containing up to hundreds of individual bomblets or sub-munitions. That number is an increase of 25 per cent over the past two weeks and is expected to grow further. According to the Centre, an estimated 90 per cent of all cluster bombs were discharged between the time of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) on 11 August and the actual cessation of hostilities on 14 August.

39. While IDF has provided some maps to UNIFIL regarding cluster strikes, they are not specific enough to be of use to operators on the ground. I expect that Israel will provide further detailed information to UNIFIL regarding the exact location, quantity and type of cluster munitions utilized during the conflict. In addition to cluster munitions, unexploded bombs, rockets, mortars and other ordnance also litter the south and areas to the north and east of Lebanon. I am sad to report that three Lebanese military engineers were killed when an unexploded bomb they were neutralizing detonated. The contamination poses a serious threat to the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the enhanced UNIFIL force whose mission is to assist them. Unexploded ordnance has been found inside UNIFIL bases, along patrol routes and in proposed locations for the expanded deployment. The humanitarian impact of these explosive remnants of war on civilians has resulted in at least 14 deaths and 57 injuries. The vast majority of these casualties have been young men and boys. In addition to the threat to human lives, unexploded ordnance poses an obstacle to the return of displaced families, access to housing and agriculture activities affecting the livelihoods of the population of southern Lebanon.

40. The United Nations Mine Action Team continues to assist the national demining office, other branches of the Government of Lebanon and United Nations

and NGO humanitarian actors to mitigate the threat. Lebanese military engineers, teams from the non-governmental organization Mines Advisory Group and teams provided through the Swedish Rescue Services Agency are on the ground clearing unexploded ordnance. In addition, under the United Nations Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid Response, the United Nations Mine Action Service has contracted and deployed five explosive ordnance disposal teams, five battle area clearance teams and three technical survey teams. Additional capacity in explosive ordnance disposal and battle area clearance are already planned and should be deployed in the coming weeks. These efforts have already resulted in the destruction of over 15,000 individual cluster munitions as well as hundreds of other unexploded ordnance. Unexploded ordnance awareness for returning populations has been provided by the national committee for mine risk education, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund, and unexploded ordnance safety training for aid workers and mission staff has also been provided by the United Nations Mine Action Service in Beirut and Tyre. All of this has been made possible by the enthusiastic response by donors to the mine action components of the flash appeal and early recovery proposal through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action and bilaterally. While the response has been encouraging, more is needed in the coming months and years to ensure that the threat is fully neutralized.

41. While coordinated with the humanitarian efforts above, I would like to mention specifically the response within UNIFIL. The first reinforcements of French troops included military engineers, who along with the existing Chinese capacity have been securing UNIFIL facilities. Additional clearance capacity has been promised by troop-contributing countries and should be deployed in the coming months. As these capacities come online, they will be able to address the implicit mandate contained in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) to protect UNIFIL and other mission personnel as well as the explicit mandate to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. Based on funding requested and capacity, it is estimated that it will take well over a year to clear the cluster bomblets.

G. Delineation of borders

42. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. The Council also requested me to develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shab'a Farms area.

43. I have previously noted the repeated statements by representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic that the Shab'a farms area is Lebanese and not Israeli-occupied Syrian Arab Republic territory, as determined by the United Nations on the basis of the Blue Line, and my caveat that the determination by the United Nations of the status of the Shab'a Farms is without prejudice to any border delineation agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. I have previously called on both Governments to urgently take steps in keeping with international law to reach such an agreement. I have also noted Lebanon's readiness to deal with this issue and urgently called for the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic.

44. It is important to emphasize that the issue of the Shab'a Farms area continues to be put forward — in contradiction to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council — to justify the existence and activities of Hizbollah insofar as militant activity across the Blue Line is concerned. In light of the Syrian Arab Republic statements indicating that the Shab'a Farms area is Lebanese, clarifying the status of the area is likely to facilitate the Government of Lebanon's efforts to fully implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). A permanent solution of this issue, however, remains contingent upon the delineation of the border between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.

45. I am encouraged by my talks with the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon on this issue and note that the Lebanese remain committed to the agreement they reached in their national dialogue earlier in 2006. I also note that President Assad informed me that the Syrian Arab Republic was prepared to go ahead with the delineation of its border with Lebanon and that he was ready to meet with Prime Minister Siniora at any time to discuss all issues of common interest. I reiterate my strong expectation of speedy steps towards an agreement on the delineation of the border as an important means to help fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon in fulfilment of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

46. In this context, I have taken careful note of an alternative path, suggested by the Government of Lebanon, to achieve progress on clarifying, in particular, the status of the Shab'a Farms. In his Seven Point Plan, Prime Minister Siniora proposed that, together with an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, agreement would be declared on a number of elements, including a commitment from the Security Council to place the Shab'a Farms area and the adjacent Kafr Shuba hills under United Nations jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled. Implementation of such a measure would still require the determination of the precise geographic scope of the Shab'a Farms area, which I have previously identified as an essential element to be addressed in a letter I sent to Prime Minister Siniora on 5 June 2006 regarding his question about the possible steps to be undertaken, from the perspective of the United Nations, for the sovereignty of the Shab'a Farms area to be transferred from the Syrian Arab Republic to Lebanon. I am now studying carefully the complicated cartographic, legal and political implications of such an approach and will revert to the Council in due course.

II. Establishment of diplomatic relations

47. I wish to note the assurances given to me by President Assad that the Syrian Arab Republic is prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon and that he is ready to meet at any time with Prime Minister Siniora to discuss all issues of common interest. Prime Minister Siniora has informed me that he stands ready to meet with the President of the Syrian Arab Republic at any time to discuss such issues according to an agreed agenda. I reiterate my expectation of the early initiation of a process between the two countries, based on an agreed action agenda, which will eventually lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations. President Assad informed me that he

considered this a sovereign decision, and that the details and timing must be worked out between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.

I. Captured soldiers and prisoners

48. The unconditional release of the captured Israeli soldiers and the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel are both of vital importance. I have made these issues a top priority during my efforts over the past weeks. My discussions in the region, in particular with the Government of Israel, the Government of Lebanon and Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, have impressed on me that resolution of these issues is an inherent necessity. I have also been made to understand that all relevant parties are open to a discussion of the issues at stake.

49. I also wish to note that in his Seven Point Plan, Prime Minister Siniora suggested that, together with an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, agreement would be declared on a number of elements, including an undertaking to release the Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

50. I have raised humanitarian issues, in particular the release of the Israeli soldiers captured by Hizbollah, with the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran. I have been encouraged by their support of my calls for the release of captured soldiers and prisoners.

51. I have appointed an experienced facilitator specifically tasked to address these vital issues. Because of the nature of such efforts, I am not at liberty to outline in detail how the release of the captured and of prisoners may be accomplished. I do look forward to reverting to the Council on this matter at the earliest opportunity.

J. Blockade

52. A further element that had to be addressed owing to its inherent relevance to the short term was the comprehensive aerial and maritime blockade (sea) imposed on Lebanon with the eruption of hostilities on 12 July. Throughout recent weeks, the revocation of the blockade was naturally a key interest of the Government of Lebanon, in particular given its harmful effects on the Lebanese economy. The Government of Israel had justified the blockade as a necessary measure to ensure the maintenance of the arms embargo sanctioned by the Security Council in paragraph 15 of its resolution 1701 (2006).

53. Along with the issue of captured soldiers and prisoners, I saw the goal of ending the blockade as another top priority during my efforts in recent weeks. I am pleased to report that Israel fully lifted the aerial blockade on 8 September and the maritime blockade on 7 September, after my discussions with all concerned parties led to a consensus on the necessary security arrangements to ensure sufficient and uninterrupted maintenance of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1701 (2006). I have reported on these measures in more detail above.

54. I now look forward to the imminent deployment of the United Nations naval task force off the Lebanese coast to assist the Lebanese authorities in securing the maritime border and to replacement of the interim maritime task force currently in operation.

IV. Observations

55. Once again, part of the Middle East is emerging from the aftermath of war, destruction and crisis. A tragic 34-day conflict has thrown the region back into the instability that prevailed for decades. In its aftermath, much work must be done and much of it, sadly, must be re-done. I have spoken to the Council about how the Lebanese and Israeli peoples were brutally dragged back into war and confrontation. I reiterate the previous commitment of the United Nations to support Lebanon and the Lebanese people as they move forward. I also wish to assure the Israeli people that the United Nations is committed to their security and well-being, along with that of all other peoples in the region. Security, stability and comprehensive peace remain the overarching goals. As I have outlined in the present report, a start has been made. But many other steps are required.

56. I am pleased to note that in Lebanon itself, the Government, in reflection of a true national consensus, has decided in clear terms that there can only be one source of law, order and authority. I commend the Government and Prime Minister Seniora for their decision and their efforts. I am also greatly encouraged by the statements made to me by relevant parties, including the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran, during my mission to the region and expect them further tangible cooperation. No State in the region or elsewhere would tolerate the existence of armed groups which challenge the State's monopoly on the legitimate use of force throughout its territory. Indeed, many of Lebanon's neighbours and other concerned actors have taken strict measures to ensure the prevalence of the State. It is my hope that they will extend their full cooperation in implementing the relevant measures, as is requested of them in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

57. In this context, I urge all States to channel their humanitarian assistance, economic recovery and the wider political and economic reconstruction to the Government of Lebanon. More broadly, the economic reconstruction and recovery of Lebanon will require significant sustained support and assistance from the international community.

58. While short-term measures are currently being put in place in a variety of ways to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is converted into a permanent ceasefire, a sustainable long-term solution can only be implemented on the basis of inclusive political processes, domestically in Lebanon as well as in the wider region, as recognized in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). At the same time, I wish to note that permanent respect of the Blue Line can only be expected to be sustainable if, on the Lebanese side, security arrangements are put in place to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. In addition, all forces other than the regular Lebanese Armed Forces must be disarmed, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). At the same time, on the Israeli side, over-flights must cease completely.

59. I welcome the troop contributions to date and the commitments by Member States to support and reinforce UNIFIL. I take special note of the willingness of the Governments of Italy and France to step forward and take leading roles, and the European commitment overall, as well as those of Asian and African Member

States. As a result of these contributions, UNIFIL will have a truly diverse character, which is evidence of the international community's deep commitment to seeing peace reign in the Middle East. A fully resourced UNIFIL is within reach and I count on Member States to rapidly honour their pledges to provide all necessary troops and equipment. I also wish to express my gratitude specifically to Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and Jordan for their assistance to United Nations missions over the past month.

60. In order to prevent a resurgence of violence and bloodshed the underlying causes of conflict in the region must be addressed. Other crises cannot be ignored, especially in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as they are all interlinked. Until the international community insists on a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, any one of these conflicts has the potential to erupt and engulf the entire region.

61. I will continue my efforts to pursue the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant resolutions and will report to the Council at regular intervals.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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12 September 2006

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General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Item 19 of the provisional agenda*
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Letter dated 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 September 2006 addressed to you by Murat Soysal, Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki İlkin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/61/150

06-51947 (E) 150906

Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 25 August 2006 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/60/991-S/2006/691), which yet again contains allegations of violations of the "airspace of the Republic of Cyprus" and of the "flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia", and to bring to your kind attention the following.

In response to such false and pretentious allegations, I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that allegations of so-called violations of the flight information region or violations of air traffic regulations are invalid, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services.

As stated in our previous letters, claims that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, are baseless. Such claims by the Greek Cypriot side are divorced from the existing realities in Cyprus, namely, the existence of two independent States, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within and above its respective territory on the island.

Attempts by the Greek Cypriot representatives to confer legitimacy upon an illegal administration will be futile as long as the Turkish Cypriot people refuse to bow to its writs. What would indeed be conducive to a better climate on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to stop arrogating itself the rights and responsibilities it does not legally have, and to cease all hostilities towards the Turkish Cypriot people.

It is worth mentioning that more than two years have elapsed since the separate simultaneous referendums held in Cyprus on your settlement plan on 24 April 2004, in which the Greek Cypriot side, at the behest of its leadership, resoundingly voted against a comprehensive solution, and therefore all efforts towards reunification and reconciliation have been impeded by the Greek Cypriot administration. Some 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, voted for the reunification of the island and the establishment of a new partnership. The plan was a compromise which had the backing of the international community as a whole. As you stated in your subsequent mission of good offices report (S/2004/437) dated 28 May 2004, the Turkish Cypriot people voted in favour of it notwithstanding the great sacrifices it entailed for them. In this respect, the futile attempt of the Greek Cypriot representative to depict the Turkish Cypriot side as a "secessionist entity" is a clear indication that the Greek Cypriot side has not come to terms with the realities and attempts to distort the picture.

What is more, as you put it in the above-mentioned report, "the Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them ... I would hope that the members of the [Security] Council can give a strong lead to all States

to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)". I would like to reiterate once again the firm commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem under the auspices of your good offices mission and on the basis of the Annan plan and well-established United Nations parameters.

The Greek Cypriot administration should be reminded, once again, that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey. Following the rejection by the Greek Cypriot side of the United Nations settlement plan, the international community in general the United Nations in particular still expect concrete actions from the Greek Cypriot administration demonstrating its political will and sincerity for a fair and just settlement in Cyprus.

(Signed) Murat **Soysal**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/61/339–S/2006/732

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Item 13 of the provisional agenda*
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 12 September 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list of Israeli acts of aggression against Lebanon that took place between 11 September 2006 and 12 September 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/61/150.

06-51989 (E) 140906 140906

Annex to the identical letters dated 12 September 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Subject: Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 0800 hours on 11 September 2006 to 0800 hours on 12 September 2006

Air violations

There were three air violations by enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft reported.

At 1158 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre and circled over the South, leaving Lebanese airspace at 1525 hours over Bent Jbail.

At 1502 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre and circled over the South, leaving Lebanese airspace at 1730 hours over Rmaich.

Between 1800 hours and 2230 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft overflew the areas of Tyre and Al-Nabatiye.

Land violations

Between 0900 hours and 1600 hours, a Poclain excavator belonging to the enemy Israeli forces and about six workers dug a ditch and installed a barbed-wire strip inside Lebanese territory (at a distance of about 10 metres from the border) approximately 1.5 km long from Metulla gate (al-Marj) east towards Hamamis hill. They were accompanied by a patrol of said forces consisting of two Hummer vehicles inside occupied Palestinian territory and an M-113 armoured personnel carrier inside Lebanese territory.

Between 1400 hours and 1800 hours, in the 'Arid al-Namal area inside Lebanese territory between the towns of Houla and Meis al-Jabal opposite the Al-Manara outpost, two bulldozers belonging to the Israeli enemy cleared about 15 dunums of forested land. They also bulldozed an outpost formerly used by the resistance.

Between 1800 hours and 1900 hours, two Poclain excavators and a bulldozer belonging to the enemy Israeli forces bulldozed the resistance's former Ghajar outpost inside Lebanese territory at a distance of about 20 metres from the newly installed barbed wire strip around the town of Ghajar.

At 1830 hours, an enemy Israeli patrol consisting of three Hummer vehicles and about 20 infantry was seen next to the barbed wire strip between the Radar and Birkat al-Naqqar outposts inside the occupied Shab'a farmlands. The infantry soldiers crossed the Blue Line in the direction of the old Shahal outpost inside liberated Lebanese territory and then left at 1935 hours in the direction of the aforementioned farmlands.

In the wake of the Israeli enemy's use of cluster bombs against residential areas during its attacks on Lebanon, many of these bombs have been reported to have exploded, resulting in injury to three persons during the period in question:

At 1300 hours, on the outskirts of the town of Al-Bazouriye, while a Palestinian, Ali Numayri, and a Syrian, Muhammad al-Fa'ur, were herding livestock, a cluster bomb exploded, resulting in multiple injuries to both (their condition is not serious), and the loss of several head of livestock.

At 1715 hours, in the town of Rechcknanay, a cluster bomb left behind by the Israeli aggression exploded, resulting in injury to Muhammad Hasan's left foot (his condition is not serious).

United Nations S/2006/733

Security Council

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Letter dated 8 September 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report of 18 August 2006 on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2006/670), in which I informed the Security Council of the need to reinforce the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a range of specific capabilities, including a maritime unit for patrolling the coastline.

I should like to inform you that, in accordance with paragraphs 11 (f) and 14 of resolution 1701 (2006), we have received a request from the Government of Lebanon for assistance with the monitoring and patrolling of the Lebanese territorial waters. I am pleased to inform you that a group of Member States, comprising France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, have agreed to provide assistance for this purpose on an interim basis. The deployment of these interim naval forces, which are led by Italian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi, was a prerequisite for the lifting of the naval blockade imposed on Lebanon. UNIFIL has established a naval operations centre at its headquarters in Naqoura to coordinate all operational details with the relevant authorities.

In the meantime, preparations for the deployment of a full naval task force under the command of UNIFIL are proceeding. It is anticipated that the UNIFIL task force will assume the responsibilities currently discharged by the naval forces of the Member States referred to above as soon as it can be assembled, on the basis of mutually agreed working arrangements with the Lebanese authorities.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. **Annan**

06-51965 (E) 130906

United Nations S/2006/734

Security Council

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Letter dated 13 September 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 8 September 2006 (S/2006/733) concerning the reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon pursuant to paragraphs 11 (f) and 14 of resolution 1701 (2006) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Adamantios Th. **Vassilakis**
President of the Security Council

06-51959 (E) 130906